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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this study is to speculate on what 
caused the conservative Southern Democrats to bolt the 
National Democratic Party and form the Dixiecrat Movement 
of 19^3, and to demonstrate whether or not the proposed 
thesis is in fact correct.
The proposed thesis is that the Dixiecrat Movement of 
1 9 ^ 8 was the result of the internal struggle which had 
disrupted the National Democratic Party from 1932 to 19^8,
In order to demonstrate the stated proposition, the 
characteristics of the Dixiecrat Movement and the charac­
teristics of its Deep Southern bailiwick are presented and 
related to the characteristics of the conservative Southern 
faction in the Democratic intra-party feud. The leaders, 
issues, interests, policies, strategy and tactics are 
analyzed and compared in order to show the coincidence 
between the objectives of the Dixiecrats and the objectives 
of the conservative Southern Democrats who had opposed the 
New Deal politics and policies of the National Democratic 
Party and to establish the relationship between the Dixie­
crats and the feuding conservative Southerners.
It was found that significant comparative material 
exists and it is concluded that the proposed thesis is 
valid. It is further concluded that the Dixiecrat Movement 
of 19 ^ 8 was not an isolated political phenomenon because it 
has influenced political events in the South since 19^8.
viii
THE DIXIECRAT MOVEMENT OP 194-8 
A STUDY IN POLITICAL CONFLICT
INTRODUCTION
Prior to 1850 political parties were little known 
except in the United States and Great Britain, but by 1950, 
political parties had become intricate parts of the politi­
cal systems in nearly every country in the western world. 
Some students of the subject parallel the evolution of 
political parties with the development of the political 
institutions of a particular country, while others assert 
that the development of political parties was the result 
of social and economic conditions.
Maurice Duverger is representative of the group of 
scholars who parallel the development of political parties 
with the development of political institutions. He states 
that with the development of nineteenth century democracy 
and the subsequent extensions of suffrage, already 
existing legislative groups formed liaisons with electoral 
committees in order to reach the newly enfranchised voters 
and thereby gain supporters for the elections necessitated 
by a democratic system. The continuation, extension, and 
strengthening of these ties developed into lasting
2
political parties,1 As democratic politics continued to 
develop and become more sophisticated, in both Europe and 
the United States, Institutional theorists conclude that 
political parties became similarly more effective and 
important,
On the other hand, scholars such as Frank Sorauf state 
that the formation of political parties was the product of 
social and economic pressures evident in Europe and the 
United States during the nineteenth century, Sorauf con­
tends that economic and social pressures directly influ­
enced the formation of political factions and interest 
groups that subsequently evolved into political parties.^
Although social and economic pressures probably 
affected the formation of democratic institutions and 
political parties, the causal relationship between such 
pressures and the development of political parties should 
not be considered primary. Social and economic faction­
alism existed before the nineteenth century under varied
3*Maurice Duverger, Political Parties (New York, 1965) 
xxiv, xxv, xxvi, xxvii, xxix and 212 j Gerald Pomper, 
Nominating the President: The Politics of Convention
Choice (New'York, 1966) 19-20? S. S. Schattschneider,Party 
Government (New York, 1942), 6 9 °
^Prank J. Sorauf, Political Parties in the American 
System (Boston, 1964) 20-21? Moisie Ostrogorski, Democracy 
and the Organization of Political Parties (Chicago^ 1964) 
xxviii? and Avery Leiserson, Parties and Politics; An 
Inst 1 tut! ona 1 and Be ha v i ora 1 Appr oach (N ew" Y or k , 1 9 i>BT 36,
political systems, but political parties did not evolve.3 
Indeed, social and economic forces can be readily shown to 
have affected the revolutionary changes which resulted in 
the rise of democratic governments in Europe and the United 
States, but without the institutionalization of democracy, 
political parties or similar organizations would ha vs been 
limited to functioning as pressure groups or special 
interest groups.
Despite the differing interpretations regarding the 
evolution of political parties, most scholars agree that 
political parties pursue electoral success in order to 
acquire political power.^ In functioning democratic 
systems, the possession of political power hinges on elec­
toral success and the subsequent control of government 
which electoral success yields.
In the United States, the two party system developed 
along with democratic Institutions. The disestablishment 
of the aristocratic caucus system in 1824 and the extension 
of white male sufferage in 1828 affected the need to 
acquire greater voter support in order to win elections,
3The term political parties is intended to mean an 
organized body of leaders and supporters which supports 
candidates for the purpose of competing in elections for 
public office. This does not include interest groups or 
factions which lack electoral functions. Such character­
istics exclude pre-19th Century "political parties".
^E. S. Schattschneider, The Semi-Sovereign People (New 
York, 1 9 6 5 ) 20? Duverger, op. cit., xxvi? Nelson W. Polsby 
and Aaron B. Wildavsky, Presidential Elections: Strategies
of American Electoral Politics (New York, 1 9 6 8 ) 24-26 ? and 
Sorauf, op. cit., £ and 9 .
5and significantly Increased the level of competition 
between the two predominant political p a r t i e s .5
From 1828 to I860, the Importance of political parties 
increased, and their functions expanded as the American 
electoral system became more complex and the voters 
Increased in number and were dispersed throughout the 
expanding frontiers. By i860 political parties had become 
so intrinsic a part of the American political system that 
the achievement of political power was determined by party 
competition and strength. This has remained true.
A major American political party is made up of a 
loosely organized system of state and local party groups 
which function, to a great extent, independently of one 
another. Every four years these groups assemble under the 
auspices of the party*s national leadership in order to 
nominate a presidential candidate and to support his bid 
for election. 6 The major American political parties possess 
little central power. National officials conduct and 
regulate a particular party *s convention, but otherwise,
^Pomper, op. cit., 19*20. As a result of the 1824 
presidential election, there was a re-alignment of the 
existing American political parties, and two parties formed 
each supporting one of the major candidates of 1824. The 
Republicans formed behind John Adams and the Democrats 
formed behind the defeated Andrew Jackson. For information 
regarding political party systems see Duverger, Political 
Parties.
^Duverger, op. cit., 210; and Pomper, op. cit., 8 7 .
they are virtually powerless to control individual state 
organizations.7
In order to elect its presidential candidate, a major 
American party must gain support from a geographic, 
occupational and ethnic cross-section of American voters.
In the United States it is not enough to gain the support 
of a single region or type of voter , 8 and this requirement 
has resulted in marked homogeneity between the major 
American parties. In their efforts not to alienate any 
necessary element of the electorate, the major American 
parties essentially present the same non-ideological 
approach to issues, and in many instance^, it is difficult 
to determine any significant differences between their 
positions regarding major issues and policies.9
The *Winner-take~allM electoral arrangements of American 
politics has made it extremely difficult for political
7Pomper, op. cit., 253s and Duverger, op. cit., 210.
Qpomper, op. cit., 8 .
9schattschneider, Semi-Sovereign People, 90-93• (He
notes that a trend of nationalization has made the politi­
cal parties more and more alike.) Also see Pomper, op. cit., 
?4. (Pomper notes that differences are evident in party 
platforms, but he concludes that parties most often dupli­
cate each other in important matters. Pomper * s treatment 
of platform differences is tenuous as a refutation of the 
homogeneity between the major U. S. parties. Although he 
lists divergent positions, he does not indicate how strongly 
such differences were stressed in the campaigns or in which 
geographic sections of the country and for which types of 
voters such issues were pursued. Because divergent views 
were stated in platforms is no guarantee that they were 
presented by the candidates to the voters.)
7parties other than the two major competitors to develop or 
function. Under the single-member district and the simple- 
majority single-ballot presidential voting system, American 
two-partyism has endured.10 However, the American 
political party system has experienced the rise of many 
minor or third—party movements.
In 19^8 the two major American political parties 
engaged in presidential politics. Also participating in 
the 1 9 ^ 8 presidential election were two minor or third 
political parties. In contrast to the Democratic party and 
the Hepublican party, neither of these minor parties had 
ever participated in an American presidential election 
prior to 19^8. The following essay is devoted to a study 
of one of the American third parties involved in the 19^8 
presidential election, the Dixiecrat Movement of 1 9^8 .
In 1929 the Great Depression engulfed the United 
States bringing economic and social deprivation to every 
part of the country. Largely due to a lack of economic 
awareness, President Hoover and his administration 
unsuccessfully struggled with the steadily worsening 
situation. In 1932 Franklin D. Roosevelt, a progressive 
Democrat, was elected President, and he initiated a series 
of economic and social programs which sought to stem the
lODuverger, op. cit., 217-218.
llThe Dixiecrat Movement of 19^8 was officially known 
as the States1 Rights Party. The term Dixiecrat was a 
popularized title used during the 1 9 ^ 8 election by 
journalists and writers, and this writer prefers to use 
it because it conveys an impression of the sectional 
character and local color of this third party movement.
8Great Depression and which eventually transformed the 
economic, social and political character of American life*
Through stringent Federal regulations, economic recovery 
was slowly achieved, but the results of the New Deal were 
not effected without significant disruption within the 
ranks of the national Democratic party. This intra­
party struggle evolved into a bitter intra-party feud and 
finally into open conflict. The consequence of this feud 
was the Dixiecrat Movement of 1948, and the evolution of 
this movement is the subject of the ensuing study. In 
order to pursue this study, the following thesis is 
proposeds the Dixiecrat Movement of 1948 was a narrowly 
based, Deep Southern third party movement which arose from 
an intra-party feud which split the national Democratic 
party, during the period from 1932 to 1948, into liberal 
and conservative, northern and southern factions. This 
intra-party feud was evident in both the presidential and 
congressional politics of the Democratic Party; and, the 
Dixiecrats were most successful in the black belt regions of 
the Deep South. By establishing this thesis, the 
characteristics, interests, and objectives of the Dixiecrat 
Movement of 1948 will be demonstrated, and by means of this 
study, the political significance of the Dixiecrat Movement 
of 1948 will be presented.
CHAPTER I
THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE BLACK BELT 
REGIONS OF THE AMERICAN SOUTH
The proposed thesis states that the Dixiecrat Move­
ment of 19^8 was a narrowly based Deep Southern third 
party movement which was most successful in the black belt 
regions of the South; therefore, a detailed analysis of the 
geographic, economic, social and political characteristics 
of the Deep Southern black belt regions will provide both 
an introduction to the ensuing essay as well as data 
essential to the examination of the proposed thesis.
The southern black belt regions of the United States 
extend from Southside Virginia to East Texas, and reach 
into North Florida, Southwest Tennessee and Southeast 
Arkansas; and even a cursory inspection yields the conclu­
sion that as an aggregate, the black belt regions 
represent a geographically significant part of the 
southern states. Discounting the vastness of West Texas,
9
10
the black belt regions constitute approximately one- 
quarter of the total land area of the American South.1
In 19^8 the American South possessed a predominantly 
rural population, and among rural southerners, farmers and 
farm laborers composed the largest income group. The 
Southern Editors Association estimated that 60 percent of 
the total southern population was rural, and that over 71  
percent of the rural population was involved in farming.^ 
The existence of a significant rura1-farm population is 
consistent with the historical development of the southern 
plantation-poor-white and yeoman-farmer system. From 1820 
to i860 the interior of the South was gradually transformed 
from rugged frontier into large, family-owned plantations.
lSee Appendix I for a detailed geographic presentation 
of the southern black belt regions. The approximate 
boundaries are highlighted by significant geographic loca­
tions. The boundaries were constructed by comparing V. 0. 
Key*s non-detaiied outline of the black belt regions with a 
detailed map of the Southern United States. See V. 0.
Key, Southern Politics in State and Nation (Baton Rouge,
1 9 ^ ' 9 ; and Readeras Digest Great World Atlas 
(Pleasantvilie, 1 9 6 3 ) ^7® or any" other detailed geographic 
rendering of the southern states. The southern black belt 
regions are usually defined according to racial composition, 
primarily being those regions with the greatest percentage 
of black population. However, this essay will develop a 
definition of the black belt regions which identifies 
other significant characteristics in addition to the usual 
racial standard.
^The Southern Editors Association, The Southerners A 
Biographical Encyclopaedia of the Southern People; A 
Newspaper Reference Work (New Orleans, 19^51 9 and~l8; also 
see, Calvin B. Hoover and B. U. Ratchford, Economic 
Resources and Policies of the South (New York, 1951) ^1? 
and John C. McKinney and Edgar T. Thompson, eds., The 
South in Continuity and Change (Durham, 19&5) 203 and 228.
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The original settlers cleared the virgin southern forest 
and took possession of extensive tracts of rich farm land.
These settlers gradually developed into prosperous back- 
country gentlemen, and with the development of the cotton 
gin, cotton became the mainstay of the southern economy.
Later settlers were forced to homestead le ss richly endowed 
land, and consequently, a poor to semi-prosperous white 
farmer group also emerged. Regardless of the degree of 
their prosperity, the majority of white southerners 
achieved comparative self-sufficiency based on agriculture.3 
The developing economy of almost the entire South was 
based upon agriculture or the support of agriculture, and 
until the advent of the Great Depression, cotton continued 
to be the largest southern crop and the basis of the 
southern economy.^
In the 1930*s and 19**0*s the Great Depression and the 
New Deal caused significant changes in the traditional 
pattern of southern agriculture. When it became 
uneconomical to cultivate cotton exclusively, crop and 
product diversification spread throughout the South.
Cotton cultivation was supplemented by wheat, alfalfa,
3see Wilbur J. Cash, The Mind of the South (New York,
1 9^1 ), for a detailed analysis of the development of the 
South and southern agriculture.
*H/hen the bottom fell out of the cotton market, 
severe economic hardship swept the South. See, McKinney 
and Thompson, op. cit., 203? Peter Molyneaux, "The Second 
Civil War", Forum (August, 193*0 100-102? and Webster 
Powell and Addison T. Cutler, "Tightening the Cotton Belt",
Harper*s Magazine (February, 193*0 308-318,
12
peanuts, soy beans, fruit, tobacco, and truck farming; and 
fallow farmland was utilized to raise beef and dairy cattle, 
hogs and poultry. New Deal crop limitations made it more 
advantageous for farmers to have larger acreage units, 
fewer workers and more machinery, and consequently, many of 
those who had depended on farming were forced to find new 
occupations,5 The black belt regions possessed the South*s 
best farmland and the finest southern plantations were 
usually located in black belt regions. Indicative of the 
amount of farming that was still being done throughout the 
South in 19^8 was the fact that in 19^7 southern farmers 
bought 55 percent of the total national fertilizer product. 
Because large amounts of fertilizer are necessary to 
replenish cotton impoverished land, and since the black 
belts were f*King Cotton^s” domain, it may be concluded that 
a significant amount of the fertilizer purchased in the 
South was being used by black belt farmers.^ Despite 
changes such as diversification and consolidation, farming 
continued to be a major occupation throughout the South and
in the black belt regions.?
5Hoover and Ratchford, op. cit., **1 , 6 2 , and 1 0 8
(Page 108 lists the figures of the decline in agricultural
workers.)? and The Southerner, op. cit., 18.
^Hoover and Batchford, op. cit., 5*
?McKinney and Thompson, op. cit., 203*
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By 19^8 many of the industries and industrial centers 
of the American South were located in black belt regions.
In 19^9 approximately one-sixth of the total United States 
manufacturing establishments were located in the southern 
states. Southern industry employed approximately one- 
seventh of the total United States production workers, and 
disbursed a payroll amounting to about one-tenth of the 
total United States industrial wage. In 1 9 2 9 the six 
largest southern industries were textiles, lumber, food 
production, tobacco, furniture and oil* and the most 
industrialized states were North Carolina, Georgia and 
Texas•®
Between 1935 and 1937 southern spinning mills 
accounted for 85 percent of the cotton textile products 
woven in the United States.9 in 1 9 4 5 cotton textile 
manufacturing continued to be an important industry in 
North Carolina, Georgia, South Carolina, Tennessee and 
Alabamas and, in 19^7 the cotton textile industry was among 
the four industries which employed over three-fifths of the 
southern manufacturing production workers.-*-0 Major cotton
^Hoover and Ratchford, op. cit., 116. The top six 
industries were determined according to total production and 
not according to the dollar value of the gross product.
9The Southerner, op. cit., 11.
10MeIvin L. Greenhut and W. Tate Whitman, eds., Essays 
in Southern Economic Development (Chapel Hill, 1964) 97.
C. Addison Hickman, 11 The Entreprenurial Function: The South
as a Case Study“, reprinted in Greenhut and Whitman.
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textile factories were concentrated in black belt areas 
such as Birmingham, Winfield, and Fayette, Alabama, and 
Atlanta, Georgia.H
In 1948 timber was one of the South*s most abundant 
natural resources and the basis of one of the South's 
largest and most widespread industries. In 1945 
approximately 55 percent of the land area of the South 
was forest land and almost all of this timberland was 
classified as commercial forests.12 Before the Depression, 
lumbering and its allied industries had constituted a one 
billion dollar business, and in 1947 it continued as one 
of the top four southern industries in terms of the number 
of production workers employed.-*-3 Much of the South's 
commercial timberland was located in black belt regions, 
and lumbering and by-product Industries were economically 
important. Georgia's black belt produced abundant supplies 
of lumber and naval stores and in Alabama over 20 percent 
of the wage earners were involved in the lumber business.
llThe Manufacturers Record Publishing Company, The 
Blue Book of Southern Progress (Baltimore, 1946) 26 and 45.
l2Hoover and Ratchford, op. cit., 5 and 15* This to­
tal was calculated without including the plains of West 
Texas or Oklahoma. (They treated Oklahoma as Southern.)
13The Southerner, op. cit., 8 ? and Greenhut and 
Whitman, op. cit., 97*
15
Most of Alabama’s twenty million acres of forest land 
were located in its black belt, Louisville, Mississippi, 
a black belt community, was an Important lumbering center, 
and Lufkin, Texas, the center of the newsprint paper 
industry, is in the Texas black belt. The raw material of 
the newsprint paper industry is southern slash pine.^
In 1930 the South yielded 36 percent of the total 
United States mineral product, and this percentage 
represented the production of a one and one-half billion 
dollar Industry.15 in 19^5 petroleum accounted for over 
half of the total dollar value of southern minerals, and 
the production of petroleum, coal and natural gas amounted 
to 85 percent of the total value of southern mineral 
production. By 19^8, in terms of dollar value, Texas was 
the leading southern mineral-producing state by virtue of 
its petroleum and natural gas industry.^ Over half of the 
petroleum produced in the South came from Eastern and Gulf 
Coast Texas, and it was estimated that 70 percent of the 
national oil reserve was located in Oklahoma, Texas and 
Louisiana. A significant part of this reserve was also 
calculated to be in off-shore regions.17
^ The Southerner, op. cit., 8 , 12, 1 3 , and 19; and The 
Blue Book of Southern Progress, op. cit., 20.
15The Southerner, op. cit., 8 .
l6 noover and Ratchford, op. cit., 119? and The Blue 
Book of Southern Progress, op. cit., 26.
l?Hoover and Ratchford, op. cit., 8-9 , 10 and 11. Oil 
fields were located along the southern Oklahoma border, in 
Eastern and Gulf Coast Texas and in Southern and Gulf Coast 
Louisiana. The oil reserve was estimated to be 1^ billion 
barrels.
16
Natural gas was also extracted from the oil rich land 
of Texas, Louisiana and Oklahoma, It was calculated that 
these regions possessed 80 percent of the natural gas 
reserves and accounted for 70 percent of the natural gas 
produced in the United States.18 The most significant coal 
mining activities were located in Kentucky and in the area 
surrounding Birmingham, Alabama. The black belt coal mines 
of Birmingham possessed an abundant supply of hard and soft 
coal, and in Birmingham, coal was converted to coke for 
industrial use,**-9 Louisiana black belt sources also 
accounted for the entire supply of sulfur produced in the 
United States, as well as limestone and other natural 
chemicals . 2 0
Among the national totals recorded in 1937» the South 
produced 20 percent of the pig iron, 1 7 percent of the 
rolled iron and steel and 18 percent of the structural 
and ornamental iron work produced in the United States.
The center of the iron and steel industry was Birmingham, /
18ibid.. 11.
19lbid., 9-10i The Southerner, op. cit., 20s The Blue
Book of Southern Progress, op. cit., 20 and 28. The 
largest coke manufacturing facility in the South was 
located in Birmingham, Alabama. It was the Alabama 
By-Products Corporation.
20100 percent of the United States sulfur supply was 
extracted from the sulfur cone in Southern Louisiana*s 
Plaquemines Parish. Limestone was quarried around 
Birmingham, Alabama, and was processed into lime and 
cement. See, Hoover and Ratchford, op. cit., 13? and The 
Southernerg op. cit., 1 2 , 1 3 » and 1 9 -2 0 .
Alabama, and In 1948, Birmingham continued to be an 
important black belt industrial center , 2 1
Other significant black belt industrial centers 
included Montgomery, Alabama? Macon and Savannah, Georgia? 
Jacksonville, Florida? and Louisville, Mississippi. 22
From 1 9 2 9 to 1948 the hourly wages earned by southern 
industrial workers amounted to less than 8 0 percent of the 
national average industrial wage. Since there was only one 
salaried employee for approximately every thirteen hourly 
workers, the number receiving wages below the national 
average predominated. Despite the fact that the over-all 
average southern income had increased by 2 1 9 percent 
between 1 9 2 9 and 1948, and industrial wages had increased 
235 percent between 1939 and 1944, southern industrial 
income still lagged behind the national average.23 The 
consistently lower hourly wage scale of southern industrial 
workers can b© attributed, at least in part, to the fact 
that the development of industrial trade unions in the 
South also lagged behind national development. In 1946 the
21ln 1947 Birmingham ranked 28th among the 50 major 
United States industrial concentrations. Other southern 
cities ranked were Atlanta, 26th, and New Orleans, 35th.
See, Greenhut and Whitman, op. cit., 103. Birmingham is 
located near large deposits of coal, iron ore and limestone, 
the basic components of steel, and is a significant iron and 
steel producer. See, The Southerner, op. cit., 12, 1 9 and 
20? and The Blue Book of Southern Progress, op, cit., 20 and 
32.
22The Southerner, op. cit., 18? and The Blue Book of 
Southern Progress, op. cit., 20, 26 and 86T ” ” “
23Hoover and Ratchford, op. cit., 48, 62 and 212? and 
Frank A. Hanna, "Income In the South Since 1 9 2 9 ", 
reprinted In Greenhut and Whitman, op. cit., 241-243.
CIO began a drive to enroll a million new southern members, 
but by 1950 "Operation Dixie" represented a six million 
dollar failure and ualon membership had actually dropped in 
the South. The failure of widespread unionization in the 
South may be attributed to the fact that a significant 
portion of the industrial labor force consisted of workers 
who had been displaced from agricultural jobs, were 
generally satisfied with having a job, and were fearful 
of being terminated if they became associated with a union. 
In some areas of the South, the drive to attract new 
industry was the crucial factor against union organization. 
Without unions, the potential for lower wages and longer 
hours was used as a bargaining factor to attract new 
developers. Also of importance was the fact that without 
unionization racial discrimination in relation to Industrial 
jobs was more easily effected and continued, and this 
"advantage” was attractive to southern middle-class 
whit e workers.
From 1929 to 1948 the South evolved into an 
economically important industrial section of the United
24MeKinney and Thompson, op. cit., 228? and Samuel 
Lube11, The Future of American Politics (New York, 1 9 6 5 ) 
115-117.
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States, and significant industrial development and 
concentration was evident in the black belt regions.-^ 5
The social system of the southern black belt regions 
was based upon the maintenance of white supremacy and the 
legal segregation of the races. This was generally evident 
throughout the South, but since the black belt regions 
possessed relatively fewer whites and high concentrations 
of blacks, the incentive for white supremacy was stronger. 
Whites and blacks attended different churches, schools and 
theaters; used different public rest rooms; rode on 
different buses or in designated parts of the same bus; 
lived in different neighborhoods, ate in different 
restaurants; went to different hospitals; and were even 
buried in different cemeteries. The color of skin was the 
sole criterion used to determine which facility would be 
utilized, and this resulted in two racially limited and 
separated social systems. The social system of the South 
was enforced and legalized by MJim Crow*' laws which imposed 
stringent regulations and inordinate penalties on blacks. 
The laws were designed to control every form of social
^Indicative of the developing character of southern 
industry during this period was the fact that almost 3 0  
percent of southern manufacturing establishments were 
branch plants of non-southern industries and these branch 
plants produced over 70 percent of the total dollar value 
of southern manufactured products. Branches were encour­
aged by offers of tax preferences, lower utility rates and 
cheaper labor. See Greenhut and Whitman, op. cit., 99- 
100.
interaction between whites and blacks from public meetings 
to marriage.26 Significant efforts were devoted also to 
keep ing blacks legally disenfranchised, since without thb 
ability to vote, the blacks were unable to interfere with 
white control.27 Racism was overt and generally expected, 
and blacks were legally segregated and considered to be 
socially inferior.
Politically, black belt regions favored locally con­
servative Democratic candidates who rigidly endorsed white 
supremacy and were inclined toward the interests of the 
large plantation owners and the industrial community. By 
comparison, regions outside of the black belts most often 
supported candidates who were progressive by southern 
standards since they were concerned with strengthening 
the political and economic position of the less wealthy,
26it should also be noted that the subservient Negroes 
were the ready source of cheap labor for the plantations 
and factories of the black belt regions, and by keeping 
them in "their places<! the white owners were sure of a 
cheap labor force. See, V. 0. Key, Southern Politics, 5* 
8-10, and 531* Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Age of 
Roosevelt; The Crisis of the Old Order (VolT I )
(Cambridge, 1957) 111-115; and Ralph McGill, The South and 
the Southerner (Boston, 19^3) 20-21.
27hey, Southern Politics, 5-6. Key viewed the black 
belts as the "backbone of southern political unity" and he 
concluded that "Here, in the Southern black belts, the 
problem of governance is similarly one of the control by a 
small, white minority of a huge retarded, colored 
population." (Key was comparing the political control of 
the South with British colonization.)
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small white farmers and laborers through regulation of 
railroads and corporations and the adoption of legislation 
favorable to their more modest i n t e r e s t s , ^
The outlines of political factionalism in the South 
were delineated by the radical agrarian Populist movement 
of the 1 8 9 0 *3 . In I8 9 O the price of cotton dropped 
significantly, western expansion slowed, money became ,5hardfl 
and credit was almost unattainable. As a result, small 
farmers in debt faced foreclosure notices and large numbers 
of farmers and farm laborers joined the unemployed ranks.
Reform movements such as the Greenback movement and the 
Single Tax movement arose in the mid-West and attempted to 
ease the plight of the farm poor. In 1 8 9 2 mid-western 
reformers gathered in Omaha, Nebraska, and launched the 
Populist movement. The Populists represented the 
financially depressed rural interests of the mid-West and 
the South, and they sought "easy91 money by advocating the 
transfer of fiscal control from the national banks to the 
Federal banks. In I8 9 2 Williams Jennings Bryan ran for 
president as the Populist candidate. Bryan ran for the 
"plain people", advocated government ownership of public 
utilities and industry, and was strong in the non-black
28por a statement regarding the concerns of local 
southern progressives see, Arthur S. Link, "The Progressive 
South" reprinted in Dewey W. Grantham, Jr., ed., The South 
and the Sectional Image? The Sectional Theme Since 
Reconstruct ion (New York, 19^7) 91*
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belt regions of the South, In 1 8 9 6 Bryan and Tom Watson 
of Georgia were the Populist candidates again, and after 
being endorsed by the Democratic Party, the "Popocrat” 
candidates won 47 percent of the popular vote. Again the 
non-black belt South supported Bryan, In 1900 and 1904 
Progressivism developed from Populism, and the black belt 
regions of the South continued to oppose Bryan, Watson and 
their heirs.29
During the first four decades of the twentieth 
century, neo-Populist local progressive demagogues and 
their local conservative counterparts dominated the 
politics of the Deep South. Local cognomens evolved which 
indicated both the geographic boundaries and political atti­
tudes of the different southern political factions. Local 
progressives were called hillbillies, rednecks, and woolhats, 
and local conservatives were called planters and big mules, 
and each faction established regional bailiwicks which 
usually remained constant, at least during the period when a 
particular leader actually was in power.
29Edwin P. Hoyt, Jr., Jumbos and Jackasses % A 
Popular History of the Political Wars Cilew York, 1 9 6 0) 
157-169, 1 7 2 , 17^-179* lS4, 1 9 6 , 204-206, 2 3 1 and 2 3 9 ;
C . Van Woodward, Tom Watson: Agrarian Hebei (New York,
1938)i A, M, Arnett, The Populist Movement In Georgia 
(New York, 1922); and Fred E. Haynes, Third Party Movements 
Since the Civil War; With Special Reference to Iowa: A
Study^of~S^cia 1 Poil11 cs (New York, 1965~) 2~. The objective 
of the Populists and the subsequent progressive movements 
were certainly anathema to the interests of the large 
planters, industrialists and corporations of the black 
belt regions.
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On the local level, both southern progressives and 
conservatives were generally in accord regarding racial 
issues30j but, in other policy areas, these factions were 
widely separated. According to southern standards, 
progressive leaders represented the poorerclasses of white 
and black farmers and laborers who lived in the more 
economically and socially depressed rural areas of the 
South.31 These leaders* reform programs included proposed 
increases for industrial taxation and the limiting of 
economic preferences for industries? increases in the taxa­
tion of large planters? decreased taxation of the lower 
income groups? better working conditions, higher wages, and 
shorter hours; control of child labor abuses; better 
schools, roads, and living conditions; and welfare 
assistance for the aged. The local conservative leaders 
represented large plantation owners, business and Industrial 
interests and some urban centers of the black belt. They 
supported lower agricultural and industrial taxation, 
greater economic preference, and the principle of states* 
rights. They opposed Federal intervention in labor 
practices, wage levels, control of natural resources,
30white supremacy was the dominant racial policy 
throughout the South. See, Key, Southern Politics, 8-9.
3lRobert Sherrill, Gothic Politics in the Deep South 
(New York, 1 9 6 8 ) 241.
regulation of local statutes and law e n f o r c e m e n t .32 Deep 
southern redneck progressives such as "Big Jim11 Folsom,
John Sparkman and Lister Hill of Alabama; James Byrnes and 
Strom Thurmond33 of South Carolina; Ed Hivers, Senator 
Richard B. Russell and Ellis Arnall of Georgia; Huey, 
Russell and Earl Long of Louisiana; and Vardanian, Bilbo 
and John C. Stennis of Mississippi were usually opponents 
of local big mule conservatives such as Handy Ellis,
Gessner T. McCorvey, Judge Wilkinson and James A. Simpson 
of Alabama; Gene and Herman Talmadge of Georgia; Ben 
Tillman, "Cotton Ed11 Smith and Cole Blease of South 
Carolina; Sam Jones of Louisiana; and Fielding Wright and 
Senator James 0. Eastland of Mississippi. However, despite 
the often bitter progressive versus conservative battles 
experienced on the state and local levels, Deep Southern 
Democrats (locally progressive or conservative) generally 
assumed conservative positions in matters related to 
national policies and politics.34
32Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Age of Roosevelt:
The Politics of Upheaval (Vol. Ill )~TCambridge» 19o0~) ^ 42-68 
Schlesinger, The Crisis of the Old Order, 105; Sherrill, op 
cit., 8-13, 45, 49, 204, 241, and 246; Key, Southern 
Politics, 232*
33Thurmond as Governor of South Carolina backed legis­
lation for better education, roads, and working conditions, 
and he included Negro interests in these proposed programs. 
He even went so far as to prosecute a number of whites 
accused of lynching a Negro.
34jn opposing the Bank Act of 1933, local progressives 
such as Byrnes and Long joined with local conservatives 
such as Bankhead, Connally and Sheppard; and in opposition 
to Federal control of local agencies, conservatives such 
as Connally, George, Sheppard, and Glass joined with
25
In the 1928 presidential election local Deep Southern 
factionalism was projected into national politics, A1 
Smith, an anti-Prohibition Catholic Democrat from New York, 
was supported by southern voters in the locally conserva­
tive black belt. Herbert Hoover, a dry, Protestant, ex- 
Bull Moose Progressive Republican drew support from areas 
outside the black belt which were generally noted for 
supporting local progressive politics.35
Although V. 0. Key’s data indicated this split, he 
concluded that the Smith supporters were hard core 
Democrats while the Hoover supporters were Democratic 
’’switchers" influenced by the cries of "rum and Romanism". 
Although much of the black belt favored a "wet" position 
regarding Prohibition, this position was not universally 
subscribed to,36 and with the exception of the Southern
local progressives such as Hatfield, Logan, Barkley and 
Bankhead. In both cases their national positions were 
conservative. See Congressional Record: Proceedings and
Debates of the Second Session of the Seventy-Third Congress 
of tlie~lJnTtedr^~States^f^Sierica,' Vol. - Part 2,
January 23 to February 9, 1934 (Washington, D. C., 1934) 
2193 ? and Congressional Record; Proceedings and Debates of 
the Second Session of the Seventy-Second Congress of the 
United States of America, Vol. 76 - Part 3, January 24 to 
February 1933 (Washing!on, D. C., 1933) 2508-2517. 
Similar cases can easily be found in the Congressional 
Records.
35Richard Hofstadter, The Age of Reform: From Bryan
to F 6 p. R . (New York, 1955) 326-327; and Key, Southern 
Politics, 320-328.
36Key9 Southern Politics, 138 and 23^.
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Louisiana Catholic population, the largely Protestant 
black belt did not reflect religious preferences in harmony 
with Smithfs.37
Rather, in the person of A1 Smith, the urbane New 
Yorker, local conservative interests in the black belt may 
have envisioned a less dangerous candidate than the 
Progressive Republican Hoover. Conversely, although the 
"dry*9, Protestant southerners abhored A1 Smith, the fact 
that the more progressive regions of the South almost 
uniformly supported Hoover also suggests that his 
political preferences, at least his anti-corporationism, 
meshed with the political preferences of these southern 
voters.
Geographically, economically, socially and politically, 
the black belt regions of the South constituted a clearly 
defined section of the United States, and characteristically, 
the black belts were generally distinct from other regions 
of the Sourh.
37ibld., 160.
CHAPTER II
THE CHARACTERISTICS OP THE DIXIECRAT 
MOVEMENT OF 19^3
The Dixiecrat Movement of 19*4-8 was a southern third 
party movement, and support for the Dixiecrat Movement came 
almost exclusively from the black belt regions of the Deep 
Southern states.1 Alexander Heard correlated high Dixie­
crat voter percentages with states and counties in which 
high non-white populations existed, and he concluded 
that the Dixiecrat candidates were most successful in 
areas of high non-white population.^ The states with the 
highest non-white populations possessed the most extensive 
black belt regions, and in 1 9^8 , due to legal disenfran­
chisement, southern blacks were usually powerless to 
influence electoral politics. In the black belts, voting 
was almost exclusively reserved to white voters, especially 
in the more rural areas. Therefore, a more meaningful 
conclusion is that the greatest percentages of the Dixie­
crat votes came from a white minority living in the
I9 8 . 8  percent of the Dixiecrat votes came from the 
southern states, and the greatest concentration of this 
total was in the Deep South. See Alexander Heard, A Two 
Party South? (Chapel Hill, 1952) 26.
2Ibid«, 251.
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predominantly non-white black belt regions of the South. 
On the level of local politics, these areas were the 
traditional conservative strongholds.
TABLE 1
DIXIECRAT VOTER SUPPORT AND THE RACIAL 
CHARACTERISTICS OF BLACK BELT REGIONS
States with the most extensive black Percentage of 
belt regions as established by popular vote for
estimated percentage of non-white Dixiecrat candi-
population as of 1 9 5 0 __________ _____ dates in 1 9 ^ 8
State Non-white population
Mississippi 45.5 8 7 . 2
South Carolina 38.9 7 2 . 0
Louisiana 33.1 49.1
Alabama 3 2 . 1 79.8
Georgia 30.9 20.3
North Carolina 2 6 . 6 8 . 8
Arkansas 22.4 16.5
Virginia 2 2 . 2 10.3
Florida 2 1 . 8 1 5 . 6
Tennessee 1 6 . 1 13.4
Texas 11.5 9.3
The data indicates that the greatest Dixiecrat support 
came from whites residing in areas with concentrated black 
populations, and in the South, this meant black belt 
regions. Although county and precinct data would be more 
conclusive, especially In relation to particular states, it 
is considered that the compilation of such statistics 
constitutes the proper topic for a separate study of this 
one facet of the Dixiecrat Movement; and, therefore, it is 
beyond the scope of this paper.
In Texas, the Dixiecrats received over 85 percent of 
their vote from the extreme eastern black belt counties 
which generally had over 25 percent non-white residents.
In Arkansas, the Dixiecrats received over 75 percent of 
their total vote from the black belt counties along the 
eastern and southern borders of the state. In Tennessee,
the black belt voter pattern continued as the Dixiecrats 
polled the majority of their votes in the southwest corner 
of the state around Memphis. This is Tennessee’s only true 
black belt region. Although a direct correlation is less 
evident in Virginia, the Dixiecrats were generally more 
successful in black belt areas than outside of them. The 
North Carolina voter pattern is the only clearly defined 
variation from the black belt regional strength exhibited 
by the Dixiecrats. This variation may be attributed to a 
fairly keen two party struggle in North Carolina in which 
the traditional stronghold of Democratic normalcy was in 
North Carolina’s black belt. Faced xtfith serious Republican 
opposition, something generally unfamiliar in the rest of 
the South, black belt Democratic North Carolinians remained 
close to the national Democratic party. Dixiecrat support 
came from south-central North Carolina in the areas 
surrounding the centers of North Carolina’s textile 
industry. In Florida, Dixiecrat support was evident only 
in the extreme northern part of the state above Ocala.
This vote coincided with Florida’s small black belt region. 
In the strongest Dixiecrat states, Mississippi, South 
Carolina, Louisiana, Alabama, and Georgia, the pro- 
Dixiecrat voter pattern closely followed the outlines of 
the black belt regions in each state.3
3Ibid., 251-279, The data paraphrased in the above 
text was carefully analyzed by Heard in the above-cited 
section.
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As a result of their efforts, the Dixiecrats won more 
than 20 percent of the South*s total popular vote and they 
captured all of the electoral votes of four of the Deep 
Southern states. The Dixiecrats were able to compile these 
astonishing statistics for an American third party because 
they were successful in drawing voters to the polls. They 
achieved this by constructing a platform and by pursuing an 
election campaign attacking what they asserted were the 
anti-southern, totalitarian tendencies of the national 
Democratic party and the Federal governments and, by 
formulating a strategy and tactics focused upon electoral 
success.
In Birmingham, Alabama, on July 1?, 1948, a group of 
dissident Southern Democrats, many of whom had only a few 
days before bolted the National Democratic Presidential 
Convention in Philadelphia, assembled to form and launch a 
third party movement.^ The Birmingham ,Jconference,J 
recommended j. Strom Thurmond, the Governor of South 
Carolina, and Fielding Wright, the Governor of Mississippi, 
as the Dixiecrat presidential and vice presidential candi­
dates, and they adopted a platform consistent with their 
interpretation of the principle of states* rights. The
^“Truman Shunned by Votes of South*8, New York Times 
(July 15s 1948) 1; /'Southerners Plan to Fight Truman on 
Electoral Vote”, New York Times (July 17, 1948) 1; 
“Southerners Name Anti-Truman Slate18, New York Times 
(July 18, 1948) 3? and “Southerners Map Broad Campaign”,
New York Times (July 19, 1948) 8 .
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underlying concept of the States' Bights Platform of 
1 9 4 8^ was expressed in the second paragraph of the plat­
form which declared, "We believe that the protection of 
the American people against the onward march of totalitarian 
government requires a faithful observance of Article X of 
the American Bill of Rights”.^ The platform sought to 
identify the Dixiecrats as a national party concerned with 
national issues, but this effort only poorly veiled the 
Dixiecrats1 true sectionalism. Through their platform, 
the Dixiecrats asserted that the protection of states* 
rights was the “cornerstone of the Democratic Party” but 
due to the “usurpation of power by unfaithful leaders”,
Democrats who believe in the preservation of constitutional 
government and individual liberty found the Democratic 
party intolerable.? The Dixiecrats attacked the Executive
5The Dixiecrats were formally known as the States* 
Rights Party.
^Kirk H. Porter and Donald Bruce Johnson, National 
Party Platforms 1840-1956 (Urbana, 1956) 466. Article X of 
the Bill of Bights states, “The powers not delegated to the 
United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to 
the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to 
the people.” The basis for states' rights theory is 
founded on this article and it depends upon a sympathetic 
interpretation. For such an interpretation of Article X 
see, James J. Kilpatrick, “The Case of States' Rights'1, 
reprinted in Robert A. Goldwin, ed., A Nation of States t 
Essays on the American Federal System (Chicago,~^L960)"
"For a conf 11 c1 1 ng interpre'tat 1 on see, Walter 
Berns, “The Meaning of the Tenth Amendment”, also reprinted 
in Goldwin.
7Porfcer and Johnson, op. cit., 466-46?.
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Department and the “politically minded” Supreme Court for 
promoting gradual totalitarian rule In the United States, 
and they claimed that recent executive and Judicial actions 
were tantamount to the institution of “national dominion”.
They listed decisions involving submerged oil-bearing 
lands, schools, primary elections, restrictive covenants 
and religion as Justification for their assertion.® From 
this point, their platform began to represent southern 
sectional concerns. The Dixiecrats described themselves as 
having been rejected and humiliated by the national 
Democratic party because they "repeatedly remonstrated” 
with the leadership regarding the totalitarian threat. They 
stated that the adoption of a civil rights program by the 
national Democrats was "rigged to embarrass and humiliate 
the South” because it would eliminate segregation and 
discrimination of every kind. They asserted that the 
Department of Justice was to be reorganized in order to 
enforce the civil rights program, and that such enforcement 
would result in the formation of a police state. After 
reiterating the South's "rugged loyalty” to the national 
Democratic party during previous presidential elections and 
their "irrevocable commitment" to democracy as defined by 
Jefferson, Jackson and Wilson, the Dixiecrats declared their
®Ibld., 467. The decisions cited were in cases from 
various parts of the country, and this probably represented 
an attempt to give the movement a national character, or at 
least submerge its sectionalism somewhat. However, the 
principles involved were of significant importance to 
southern interests.
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belief in the Constitution, Individual rights, the totali­
tarian character of the compaign platforms adopted by both 
major parties, the necessity of segregation, and the 
inherent evil of equal civil rights, social equality, and 
the regulation of employment practices, voting and local 
law enforcement. They affirmed that “effective e nf ore e me nt 
of such a program would be utterly destructive to the 
social, economic and political life of the Southern 
people“9; and, they clearly delineated their opposition to 
the usurpation "of legislative functions by the executive 
and judicial departments.ir^  This platform constituted the 
basis of Dixiecrat policy, and during the ensuing politi­
cal campaign, the Dixiecrat leaders reiterated its 
principles.
Governor Thurmond voiced the states* rights policy 
throughout the campaign. He told an audience that, “we 
consider the so-called civil rights legislation and many 
other like questions to be reserved to the states by the 
C o n s t i t u t i o n . D i x i e c r a t  appeals were often excited by 
overt racism, and Frank Dixon, the head of the movement in 
Alabama, asserted that opposition to the civil rights
9ibid., 467-468.
lOlbid., 468. See Appendix II for a complete presen­
tation of the Dixiecrat platform.
H H e a r d , A Two Party South?, 27#
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program was all that was necessary for success,12 Generally, 
the campaign attacked legislative and executive policies 
which the Dixiecrats considered offensive to southern 
interests and states1 rights. During the campaign,
Thurmond challenged the Federal government’s right to 
legislate restrictive regulations and to force the state 
governments to comply. He called such acts “Force Bills” 
and singled out the anti-poll tax law, the anti-lynching 
law, the anti-segretation law and the Fair Employment 
Practices Commission as e x a m p l e s . ^  in Augusta, Georgia, 
Thurmond told his audience that what they had to fear was 
“a new kind of police state with all power centered in 
Washington,” He further warned them that the United 
States was on the road to totalitarianism,1^ The
1 2 ibld., 2 6 -2 7 , In general, overt racism was not the 
predominant theme of the Dixiecrat appeal, but the usual 
southern attitude against integration and equal rights was 
clearly presented to the voters. In the keynote address 
before the Birmingham “conference”, Dixon said, “The South 
will fight the attempt to mongrelize our people”, but later, 
Thurmond rejected the help of Gerald L, K. Smith because 
his racist appeals were too much for even Thurmond. See, 
Jules Abels, Out of the Jaws of Victory (New York, 1959) 95? 
John N. Popham, “Thurmond, Candidate of Rebels, Decries 
’White Supremacy* Idea”, Mew York Times (July 20, 1948) 1? 
and “The Souths War Between the Democrats”, Newsweek 
(July 26, 1948) 21,
!3“Third Partiess Southern Revolt”, Time (October 11, 
1948) 24; and Howard P. Nash, Jr., Third Parties in American 
Politics (Washington, 1959) 307. Thurmond made the “Force 
Bill” Speech in Baltimore, Maryland.
3.4"Third Parties* Dixiecrat Medley”, Time (October 4, 
1948) 22. For additional examples of similar campaign 
speeches and appeals, see, Frank Freidel, F. D. R. and the 
South (Baton Rouge, 1965) 96-97* ”Civil Rights”, Senior 
Scholastic (October 6 , 1948) 10A; and John N. Popham, 
“Southerners Name Thurmond to Lead Anti-Truman Fight”,
New York Times (July 18, 1948) 1.
Dixiecrats believed that the issues confronted were 
important to southern voters, and at different times during 
the campaign, Thurmond confidently stated that they would 
win from 1 0 0 to 140 electoral votes in the southern 
states.3-5 The Dixiecrats were campaigning to achieve an 
electoral victory, 3-6 and in addition to developing a 
platform and campaign issues, they sought to implement a 
strategy and tactics designed to achieve their objective.
In December, 1944, Charles Wallace Collins, an obscure, 
retired constitutional attorney from Washington, D. C., 
published an equally obscure book entitled Whither Solid 
South. In the book, Collins, a member of the Alabama bar, 
sought to delineate the reasons and devise the method for 
establishing the political control of the South by a small 
group of well-to-do white southerners. 3-7 Collins argued 
many topics, including the necessity for and the correct­
ness of white supremacy, the illegality of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, and the moral and religious case for continuing
3-5“Thurmond Expects 100 Electoral Votes”, New York 
Times (October 1, 1948) 21? and “The Split in the South”, 
Newsweek (September 20, 1948) 2 9 .
3-^ At least their public attitude was that they could 
win the presidency, and they campaigned with that apparent 
objective.
3-7There has been difficulty Involved in acquiring a 
copy of Collins’ book? therefore, references to It will be 
based on two diverse sources, neither of which cites the 
ot her.
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segregation? and, he concluded with a ludicrous proposal 
for a forty-ninth state in Africa designed to accommodate 
American blacks. According to Helen Puller, a contemporary 
journalist, and Alexander Heard, Collins, in addition to 
presenting his own biased ideas, also provided the con­
ceptual basis and the strategic outline for the Dixiecrat 
Movement. In his book, Collins proposed two courses for 
creating a southern regional party by taking over the 
machinery of the Democratic party in the southern states. 
One method was to throw the presidential election into 
Congress whenever possible by putting up local candidates 
and by voting for them in the electoral college, and the 
other consisted of eliminating the presidential campaign 
from the South by having presidential electors Instructed 
by local officials, commissions or conventions, Collins 
considered that the logical conclusion would be a new 
conservative political party. Collins1 book, which Helen 
Fuller categorized as “second rate”, came to the attention 
of Senator James 0. Eastland of Mississippi, and after 
reading it, he sent a copy to Fielding Wright, Following 
a conference between Collins, Eastland and Wright, some 300 
copies of the book were mailed to leading conservative 
southerners including Strom Thurmond of South Carolina, 
Frank Dixon of Alabama, Merritt Gibson of Texas, Roy 
Harris of Georgia, John U. Barr of Louisiana and Boss Ed
38
Crump of Tennessee.18 When the Dixiecrat Movement eventually 
developed Into an active third party, the influence of 
Collins* thinking became evident in the strategy and 
tactics adopted. Strom Thurmond campaigned with the 
Intention of winning enough southern electoral votes to 
prevent either of the major parties from gaining a majority 
from the electoral college. As a result, the election 
would have gone to the House of Representatives where the 
Dixiecrats reasoned their candidates would probably be 
chosen as a compromise. However, if they failed to win 
enough electoral votes to force the election Into Congress, 
they were confident that they could take enough votes away 
from Truman to cause his defeat. With Truman defeated, 
and the South in opposition, the Democratic party would be 
badly divided, and the Dixecrats reasoned that by virtue 
of their regional strength and stability they would be able 
to assume a leadership role in the party and exercise 
control in their own bailiwick. As the movement became an 
active third party, Senator Eastland of Mississippi and John 
U. Barr of Louisiana were identified as Dixiecrat strategists.19
18Heard, A Two Party South?, 31-33 5 and Helen Fuller,
“The New Confederacy16, New Republic (December, 1948) 11-12.
19“Thurmond Expects 100 Electoral Votes*1, 21 ; Heard,
A Two Party South?, 19, 21 and 28? Helen Fuller, “The Fourth 
Party“, New Republic (March 15, 1948) 12? “Eights Party 
Gains Mounting in the South'*, New York Times (September 12,
1948) 3 6 ? “The Souths A Political Phenomenon Grips 
Dixie*s Voters", Newsweek (October 25, 194-8) 32-34? and S.
B. Ader, “Why the Dixiecrats Failed", Journal of Politics 
(August, 1953) 356-358.
39
In an attempt to achieve the strategy, and to strengthen 
their local control also, Dixiecrats tried to execute several 
political tactics in the South. In Florida, Georgia, Texas, 
Arkansas, Louisiana, Alabama, Mississippi and South Carolina, 
they attempted to take control of local Democratic party 
organizations. In most of these states, Dixiecrats already 
held significant Democratic party positions, and from such 
positions, they attempted to exert greater influence. In 
Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, and South Carolina, they 
were successful in gaining control of the local Democratic 
organization, and as a result, Thurmond and Wright appeared 
on the ballot as the official Democratic candidates. 
Throughout the South, Dixiecrats ran for election as 
Democratic committeemen and advocated the adoption of 
unassigned presidential electors. The strategy and tactics 
employed by the Dixiecrats closely resembled the political 
methods proposed by Collins to develop a powerful, 
regional, independent southern Democratic party,^0
20several of the Dixiecrats who sought to achieve their 
goals by means of the strategy and tactics described above 
were Leander Perez, Frank Dixon, Frank Upchurch, Horace 
Wilkinson, Gessner T. McCorvey and Ben Laney. Perez, the 
boss of Southern Louisiana’s mineral rich parishes, was the 
guiding force behind the Dixiecrat takeover of that state’s 
Democratic party, and the removal of Truman’s name from 
Louisiana’s ballot. Frank Dixon engineered the Dixiecrat 
takeover in Alabama and Horace Wilkinson, a Birmingham 
attorney and judge, and Gessner T. McCorvey, the leader of the 
Alabama black belt planters and the urban Industrialists,
Most southern political leaders avoided the Birmingham 
^conference” and the Dixiecrat Movement despite their 
national conservative character and their at least nominal 
opposition to the New Deal. These leaders may be 
categorized into two groups. The first group consisted of 
southern politicians who, as a result of southern 
factionalism, were local progressive leaders opposed to the 
objectives, except the anti-civil rights objective, which 
their local conservative counterparts were pursuing via the 
Dixiecrat Movement. The second group consisted of those 
southern politicians who were politically in control in 
their own states and who would have realized little advan­
tage and possible significant harm from becoming associated 
with the Dixiecrats. In some cases the non-bolting
ran for elected office as Alabama presidential electors.
In Florida, Frank Upchurch, a leading state Democratic 
committeeman, pressed the state committee to adopt a 
system of unassigned presidential electors. Ben Laney 
of Arkansas, a former Governor, prominent businessman, 
and head of the Arkansas Free Enterprise Association, 
became Chairman of the Dixiecrat1s Executive Board and 
for a brief period took control of the Arkansas Democratic 
party. Similar efforts occurred throughout the Deep 
South, especially in the black belt regions. See, V. 0. 
Key, Politics, Parties and Pressure Groups (New York, 196 6 ) 
253-2557”Clinton Hossiter, Parties and Politics in 
America (New York, 1 9 6 2 ) 3-10; “Report from the South”,
New York Times (July 25, 1958) 8 ; “Louisiana Strikes 
Truman Off the Ballot”, New York Times (September 11, I9A8 ) 
2 7 ; “Gaining Southern Revolt Helps Republicans”, New York 
Times (September 13, 1958) 8 ; “Truman Hit in Tennessee”,
New York Times (September 18, 1958) 8 ; “Dixiecrats Get 
Oklahoma Listing”, New York Times (August 15, 1958) 55; 
Ader, “Why Dixiecrats Failed”, 318; and Heard, A Two Party 
South?, 2 7 7 .
southerners may have also anticipated the failure of the 
movement and the subsequent punitive measures which the 
national Democratic party might attempt to enact against 
the bolters.
Among the political leaders found In the first group 
were “Big Jim“ Folsom of Alabamaf Herman Talmadge and 
Senator Russell of Georgia, and Senator John G. Stennis 
of Mississippi.
“Big Jim” Folsom was an anti-New Deal Alabama local 
progressive who campaigned among the poor farmers and 
laborers with a neo-Populist style. In 1958 he defeated 
Handy Ellis, a black belt conservative and soon to be 
Dixiecrat, for the governorship.^ In 1958 Herman 
Talmadge was running for the governorship of Georgia left 
open by his father*s death. Gene Talmadge and his son 
Herman were both heirs to the Populism of Tom Watson, 
and Herman continued his father’s anti-New Dealism. Herman 
Talmadge possessed a more moderate political demeanor 
than his demagogue father, and this, in addition to his 
progressive background and his personal antipathy for 
Thurmond, separated him from the local conservatives at
21Key, Southern Politics, 52-53. The Folsom versus 
Ellis election was a classic example of a neo-Populist 
versus a local southern conservative election. Ellis’ 
strength came from the black belt and Folsom’s from the 
poor agrarian counties outside of the black belt. Folsom 
campaigned as an agrarian radical while Ellis conducted 
his campaign in accordance with the interests of the black 
belt constituents and financial supporters.
Birmingham,22 Georgia’s Senator Russell represented a 
moderate southern position and he also found Thurmond 
personally distasteful. Despite his anti-New Dealism, 
he did not appear at Birmingham nor did he become a 
Dixiecrat.23 John C. Stennis is a local progressive who 
represents the hill counties of Mississippi. In 19^ -8 
Stennis had no interest in a conference or a movement 
with the local conservative representatives of the 
Mississippi Delta, such as Eastland and Wright,2^
Southern political leaders such as Harry Byrd of 
Virginia, E. H. s,BossM Crump of Tennessee, and Earl and 
Russell Long of Louisiana were typical of those in the 
latter group. Byrd possessed a firm grip on Virginia 
politics by means of his control of the rural political 
organization. Byrd had been a progressive governor and 
was not a racial demagogue. He was anti-New Deal, but 
never to the point where his control of Federal patronage 
was endangered. In Virginia, racism was not overt,
22j£ey, southern Politics, 109-112 % and Sherrill, 
op. cit,, 2^9 .
23Key, Southern Politics, 56? and Sherrill, op. cit.,
249.
2^stennis is from Kemper County on the eastern border 
of Mississippi in the hill country. Stennis and Eastland, 
as U. S. Senators, have often disagreed, particulaz^ly in 
regard to racial matters. Stennis is a racial moderate 
and Eastland is a racist. In recent years, they have come 
closer together but in 19^8 Stennis had no desire to bolt 
the national Democratic party or associate with Delta 
politics. See, Key, Southern Politics, 252-253? and 
Sherrill, op. cit., 205“203”i 212-214,and 317*
^3
apportionment was in favor of the rural areas, business 
possessed a secondary position and industrial money was 
not generally able to force political action. Unlike 
the politics of the Deep South, the Byrd Machine functioned 
with smooth, businesslike efficiency as typified by E. R.
"Ebbie" Combs, the powerful and effective Clerk of the 
Virginia State Senate.^5 clearly, Byrd had little in 
common with the leaders of the Birmingham ''conference” 
and even less to gain from participating in the Dixiecrat 
Movement•
The Crump Machine was effictively in control of the 
politics of Tennessee, and despite anti-New Deal senti­
ments, Tennessee political figures avoided Birmingham.
Although Crump initially endorsed Thurmond, when the time 
came actually to oppose Truman and support Thurmond, Crump, 
under pressure from his own organization, backed Truman, °
Again, little if anything could have been gained for 
Tennessee Democrats if their support had gone to Thurmond 
and the Dixiecrats. In Louisiana the Longs were in control.
Earl had been elected governor over future Dixiecrat Sam 
Jones and Russell had been elected Senator. Following 
Huey's assassination, Earl and Russell had mended relations
25Harvie Wilkinson, III, Harry Byrd and the Changing 
Face of Virginia Politics, 1945-1967> (Charlottesville,
1 9 6 6 ) 6 , 7 , 1 1 , 23, 24-25, 4o, 4l,' 4?-48, 50, 52, 6 o,
64-65 j and Key, Southern Politics, 19-35•
26"Truman Hit in Tennessee”, New York Times 
(September 18, 1948) 8 ; and Key, Southern Politics, 48, 58,
64, and 337*
with the Roosevelt Administration, and despite Federal 
prosecutions of minor Long officials on income tax 
charges, relations remained smooth. Opposition to the 
national Democratic party could only have upset the pattern 
of Louisiana politics and harmed their local hegemony.
In addition, the Long's were traditionally strongest in 
the old Populist strongholds of Louisiana, and so, 
association with the "Big Mule11 Dixiecrats could have 
weakened their voter support.27
The fact that James Byrnes of South Carolina avoided 
the Birmingham "conference" and the Dixiecrat Movement 
cannot be as easily explained as could the similar action 
taken by other southern political leaders. Byrnes was a 
progressive by South Carolina standards, he was bitterly 
anti-Roosevelt and anti-New Deal? and he had been the 
primary political supporter of the 1946 gubernatorial 
effort of Strom Thurmond. He had helped to form Thurmond's 
political style and attitudes, but in 1948, at least 
overtly, he stayed a?/ay from the Dixiecrat Movement. Byrnes
2?Key, Southern Politics, 161-164? and Sherrill, op. cit. 
15-17* In 1948 the Longs were probably not actually southern 
progressives, but they did campaign against the "interest". 
Actually, they maintained close relations with key local 
conservative figures such as Leander Perez. Through careful 
manipulation of local laws, Perez had acquired control of the 
financial management of southern Louisiana oil and sulfur, 
and he was politically powerful. Perez had been one of 
Huey's lawyers during his 1928 Impeachment trial as governor, 
and a sort of friendship developed. In 1948 Perez engineered 
the dropping of Truman's name from the Louisiana ballot.
With such connections, it would be difficult to call the 
Longs local progressives, but they did appear as such. See, 
Williams, op. cit., 11, 3 6 9 » 396, 400-402? Sherrill, op. 
cit., 1 2 -1 3 , and 15-17*
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was probably more Influenced by the belief that Thurmond 
would fail and by his own aspirations for a national 
political position. Byrnes subsequently became Truman1s 
Secretary of State, and later, in 1954 he supported 
Thurmond's bid for the U. S. Senate«^8
The Dixiecrats were successful in attracting signifi­
cant financial supporters, some of whom had previously 
backed Republican candidates. These supporters generally 
represented southern industrial and agricultural interests 
which opposed New Deal regulations, particularly price and 
wage control. Among these financial supporters were 
Robert Wood of Sears, Roebuck, Pierre S. duPont, the Vice 
President of E. I. duPont de Nemours, A. G. Heinsohn, a 
southern textile baron, Roger Milliken, the chief financier 
of South Carolina Republicanism, and oilmen H. L. Hunt and 
J. Howard Pew.29 These supporters, and their Dixiecrat
28‘rhurmond*s participation in the Dixiecrat Movement, 
when viewed in light of his southern progressive background, 
as Governor of South Carolina, seems somewhat incongruous. 
However, Thurmond possessed a single-mindedness in matters 
of race, religion, and communism that probably caused him to 
identify almost ideologically with the objectives of the 
Dixiecrat Movement. Thurmond did not bolt the Democratic 
Convention, he did not represent black belt interests as 
clearly as other Dixiecrats, but in Birmingham he embraced 
a movement which sought to combat the influences being 
exerted upon the South by the Federal government which he 
believed were left-wing and therefore anathaxna. See,
Sherrill, op. cit., 240, 242, 246-250 and 252.
29Many individual Dixiecrats were also connected with 
southern anti-New Deal financial interests. For specific 
information regarding these Dixiecrats see Chapter III,pp. 82- 
8 7 of this paper and the sources cited in reference to John 
U. Barr ( 8 3 ), Leander Perez (83 )* “Business Ben” Laney 
(83 ), Gessner T. McCorvey (84), Horace Wilkinson (84), 
Palmer Bradley ( 85 ), and Marion Rushton ( 85 )*
counterparts, were probably attracted to the movement by 
Dixiecrat policies related to industry, labor practices, 
natural resources and Federal intervention. It has been 
asserted that there was corruption involved in the financial 
dealings of the movement, but a demonstration of such 
allegations, even if possible, is beyond the scope of this 
essay,30 Maurice Duverger noted that external organizations 
such as industrial and commercial groups can affect political 
parties, but to demonstrate whether or not these influences 
are opposed to the common good is most difficult since as 
Duverger concludes, they are always cloaked in discretion.33- 
In relation to the present discussion of the Dixiecrat 
Movement, it is sufficient to note that these contributions 
existed, and that they were representative of significant 
anti-New Deal southern industrial and economic interests,32
30william J. Primm, Jr., Assistant Democratic National 
Chairman, charged that the financial support afforded the 
Dixiecrat Movement by oil and utility interests was a 
corrupt practice 5 and, journalists Edward A. Harris and 
Thomas L. Stokes made similar accusations during the I9A 8 
presidential campaign. See "Rights Party Files Costs Tardy", 
New York Times (September 17* 19^8) 20% "Soviet Like Act 
Laid to Louisiana", New York Times (September 12, I9 4 B) 375 
and Ader, "Why the Dixiecrats Failed", 365-367• For 
additional information see, Heard, A Two Party South?, 2 9 7 - 
2 9 8 ? Key, Southern Politics, 3 2 9 j Ader, The Dixiecrat 
Movement, 9 6 ? and Abels, op. cit•, 209«
3lDuverger, op. cit., XXXIV.
32b. U. Ratchford, "Recent Economic Development in the 
South", Journal of Politics (my, 19^8) 277-2?8? R. J. Harris, 
"States1 Rights and Vested Interests", Journal of Politics 
(November, 1953) ^6 6 - ^ 6 7 ; Alexander Heard, The Cost of 
Democracy (Chapel Hill, i9 6 0 ) 5^ and 122 % and Sherrill, 
op. cit., 1 2 0-1 2 1 .
*+7
To summarize, in 19^8 a southern third party movement 
possessing a narrow political and economic base arose in 
opposition to the national Democratic party and the 
Federal government. Support for this movement came almost 
entirely from white southerners living in regions of the 
South marked by large plantations, growing industry, racial 
discrimination, segregation and local conservative 
Democratic factionalism; and this third party movement, the 
Dixiecrat Movement, adopted a strategy and tactics 
originally conceived to establish conservative southern 
regional political strength.
CHAPTER-III 
WHY THE DIXIECRATS?
T f* V\n o X V  x xc* Q been demonstrated that the Dixiecrat Movement
of 19^8 arose in the black belt regions of the South and 
that the movement opposed the domestic policies of the 
Democratic party and the Federal government. In order to 
prove or disprove the proposed thesis, a demonstration of 
why the Dixiecrat Movement of 19^8 arose is crucial.
Between i860 and 1932 the Republicans, with few 
exceptions, constituted the majority party nationally, and 
by pursuing policies of economic laissez-faire and states9 
rights, they encouraged corporate capitalism. During this 
same period the Democratic party represented the minority 
in opposition, and it was supported by a loosely organized 
farmer-labor coalition. Periodically, third party reform 
movements developed to oppose the economic abuses of Big 
Business and the Republican Party, but not until after the 
1929 stock market crash and the subsequent Depression, were 
reforms achieved.
lEric F. Goldman, Rendezvous with Destiny (New York, 
1952) 255“265, 2 6 9 - 2 7 3  and ~2B6-28 9!" and Hofstadter, op. 
cit., 300-325.
**8
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In 1932 Franklin D. Roosevelt revitalized the 
Democratic party by skillfully constructing a coalition of 
small farmers and laborers from nearly every section of the 
country into the majority party, A number of ethnic groups, 
the previously Republican Negro bloc, and many white collar 
workers also supported Roosevelt, His campaign emphasized 
the plight of the "little man” caused by the Great 
Depression, and he promised economic and social reforms 
designed to foster relief and recovery. Roosevelt won the 
support of key urban areas in New York, Pennsylvania, 
Illinois, Michigan, and Texas, and this, coupled with his 
farmer-labor strength, provided the margin for victory . 2 
Following his election, Roosevelt instituted economic and 
social reforms based upon direct Federal intervention and
control.3
^Schlesinger, Coming of the New Deal, 504-505.
3Erie F. Goldman summarized the beginning of the New 
Deal as follows 1 "The day after the Inaugural the new 
President (Roosevelt) proclaimed a four day bank holiday, 
summoned Congress into special session, and started day- 
and-night White House conferences on emergency banking 
legislation .... The Hundred Days were under way, the 
most controlled, directed, overpowered period in all the 
history of Congress.” Legislation was passed during the 
Hundred Days to Insure bank deposits and stock purchases, 
ease Federal credit to small farmers and homeowners, 
reorganize the railroads, prevent phony bankruptcy 
proceedings, impose excess profit and dividend taxes, 
create the Civilian Conservation Corps, and raise prices 
by taking the country off the gold standard. Goldman, op, 
cit., 255* Also see Schlesinger, The Politics of Upheaval, 
18, ?2, and 115; Schlesinger, The Coming of the New Deal, 
424-428, 484, 471, 486, and 502; and Hofstadter, op. cit., 
304-305.
At the 1932 Democratic convention, conservative 
southern delegates contested Roosevelt’s nomination, and 
they exercised cautious control over the progressive 
candidate from New York. Roosevelt’s strongest opponent 
for the presidential nomination was John Nance Garner of 
Texas, and he was also opposed by Harry F. Byrd of 
Virginia, "Alfalfa Bill” Murray of Oklahoma and Albert 
Ritchie, the Governor of the border state Maryland.
Facing such opposition, Roosevelt avoided controversy, and 
in order to weaken conservative southern opposition, he 
indicated that he would select Garner as his vice presi­
dential runningmate Some nor them Democrats sought 
Roosevelt’s support in a debate against the two-thirds 
rule, but he tactfully declined by stating that It would 
be unfair to take a position at that t i m e . 3 Roosevelt’s 
standing among the southern delegates improved when Huey 
Long, at that time pro-Roosevelt, exerted his influence 
andeheld important southern votes in line at critical
^Hubert Eaton, Presidential Timbers A History of the 
Nominating Conventions " York, "1964)
Eugene Roseboom., A History of Presidential Elections 
(New York, 1964) 43"B.
5f. D, R. *s  convention tactics were probably influ­
enced by the fact that the Democratic National Convention 
was conducted in accordance with a two-thirds rule which 
required a two-thirds vote for the nomination of the 
presidential candidate. The rule dated from the 1832 
Democratic convention and provided the minority South with 
a veto power over the most vital decision of the party. If 
Roosevelt chose to Ignore this rule or oppose it in a 
situation where he already faced southern opposition, he 
probably would have been defeated in convention. See, 
Pomper, op. cit., 28.
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moments."*^ The 1932 Democratic convention conformed to a 
standard favored by most southern Democrats. They 
demonstrated intra-party power by controlling the vice 
presidency, they limited F. D. R. ’s policy preferences in 
the platform, and they exerted over-all Influence on the 
character of the 1932 Democratic campaign issues.?
By 1936 the initial phase of the New Deal had extended 
Federal control into almost every aspect of the economic 
and social recovery of America, and as evidenced by the 
landslide Democratic victory of 1936, Roosevelt’s popu­
larity had become prodigious. However, the presidential 
politics of 1 9 3 6 were also marked by continued conservative 
southern opposition to Roosevelt and the growing liberal 
wing of the Democratic party.
In 1935 a group of conservative southern Democrats 
initiated a third party movement designed to oppose F. D. R.’s 
renomination. Under the leadership of Gerald L. K. Smith, 
this movement planned to nominate Eugene Talmadge of 
Georgia as the true Democratic candidate. However, the 
so-called "Jeffersonian Democrats" lost momentum as the 
similarly intended Lemke-for-President movement began in
6williams, op. cit., 6 -7 *
?Eaton, op. cit., 337-345; and Roseboom, op. cit.,
437-438.
the midwestern states, and when Smith moved to the Lemke 
camp, the Talmadge movement ended.®
Roosevelt’s landslide victory overwhelmed the opposi­
tion movements, but these movements initiated open conflict 
between conservative Democrats and their Increasingly 
liberal opponents within the party.
At the 1936 Democratic presidential convention, 
conservative southern Democrats sought to upset Roosevelt’s 
nomination, and under the leadership of Senator "Cotton 
Ed" Smith of South Carolina, they demonstrated their 
opposition to Roosevelt. These efforts failed to influence 
the unity which Roosevelt had effected in the Democratic 
party. Prior to the nomination voting, the Rules Committee 
abolished the traditional two-thirds rule, and this single 
rule change ended the nearly century long veto power which 
southern Democrats had possessed over the proceedings of 
the presidential convention.
Although Roosevelt was seeking an unprecedented third 
term in 1940, conservative southern opposition to his
^Schlesinger, The Politics of Upheaval, 459-552;
Lube11, ope cit., l42-l43? Roseboom, op. cit., 452; also 
see, Key, Southern Politics, 116.
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nomination was weak and uncoordinated.9 However, conserva 
tive. southern opposition developed against Roosevelt’s 
selection of arch-liberal, Henry A. Wallace for the vice 
presidential nomination. Anti-Wallace forces were led 
by Alabama’s anti-New Deal Senator Bankhead, but despite 
this effort, Henry Wallace was nominated. H
In 1944 presidential politics were marked by intensi­
fied bitterness between the conservative southern wing of 
the Democratic party and Roosevelt’s liberal wing of the
9Saton, op. cit., 362? and Roseboom, op. cit., 468 and 
471. Roosevelt, by seeking a third term, violated the 
unwritten rule initiated by George Washington when he 
stepped down after two terms. Every other American 
president had followed Washington’s example. Roosevelt’s 
break with tradition was probably inspired by his unwilling­
ness to leave office in a time of crisis and by his own 
ego. The voters were probably willing to support him because 
of the grave domestic crisis from which he was leading a 
rally via the New Deal, and because of the international 
threat being posed by the impending World War II and his 
promise to keep the United States out of the European war.
The fear of a leadership change was probably the single most 
important factor involved in his renomination for a third 
term. Southern Democrats refrained from directly attacking 
his leadership role since such a move would have been 
unpopular with the electorate in general, and if Roosevelt 
was re-elected despite their opposition, their control of 
patronage would have been diminished and their ability to 
influence national policies would have been further 
reduced.
lOpomper, op. cit., 164. This writer also prefers the 
term selection rather than nomination to describe the vice 
presidential candidate since this candidate is most often 
selected by the presidential candidate and his nomination 
by a convention is little more than a rubber stamp 
ratification.
llEatcn, op. cit., 392? Roseboom, op. cit,, 468? and 
Pomper, op, cit., 164? also see. Key, Southern Politics,
365 for data indicative of Senator Bankhead’s anti-New 
Deal southern conservatism.
party. In 1944 conservative Democrats from Alabama, 
Mississippi, Florida, South Carolina, and Texas sought to 
prevent Roosevelt’s again unprecedented fourth nomination 
by selecting or electing convention delegates who were 
pledged, instructed, or inclined to vote against a 
Democratic ticket headed by F. D. R. These states also 
sought to utilize a system of unassigned presidential 
electors.^  Threatening not to support Roosevelt even if 
nominated, conservative southerners arrived at the 1944 
convention and they demanded that the two-thirds rule be 
reinstated, that Henry Wallace be replaced as the vice 
presidential candidate, and that white supremacy be 
recognized. The rebellious southerners placed the name 
of Virginian Harry Byrd in nomination for president. This 
movement gained support among the delegates of the seven 
Deep Southern states, and controversy persisted as the 
anti-Roosevelt Texas delegation staged a walkout following 
the Rules Committee’s decision that they would have to 
share their nominating votes with a rival pro-Roosevelt 
delegation.13 In spite of these tactics, Roosevelt was 
renominated.
l^Heard, A Two Party South?, 159? and Roseboom, op. c
579.
13These rebellious Texans later formed the unsuccess­
ful third party movement known as the Texas Regulars. See 
Heard, A Two Party South?, 55» 65 s and 159*
Conservative southern delegates also fought Wallace’s 
renominatlon, and Roosevelt, seeking to obviate conflict, 
stated that he would allow the open convention to nominate 
the vice presidential candidate. Harry Truman, the choice 
of the northern city machines, was subsequently nominated. 
He was not selected by the southerners, but they did not 
oppose him either, since coming from a border state, he 
was probably the best candidate available to them.1^
Although the strength of party affiliation and the 
desire to control patronage caused most conservative 
southern Democrats to remain loyal to the party in 1944, 
some dissidents chose to continue the conflict outside of 
the bounds of the party.^ jn Texas, Merritt Gibson
l4Roseboom, op. cit., 485-486? and Pomper, op. cit., 
104. Pomper stated, MIn 1944, the nomination of Truman for 
Vice President was first approved toy union leaders before 
the delegates acted. According to legend, convention 
managers were told to ’clear it with Sidney1, meaning 
Sidney fix liman, head of the C. I. 0. Political Action 
Committee. Even if this is only fancy, the fact of a labor 
veto power over the nomination seems established.” One 
Senate reporter stated that in 1944 Hillman was also 
responsible for Jimmy Byrnes of South Carolina being 
eliminated from consideration for the vice presidential 
nomination. This same reporter noted the bitterness 
evident among the Mississippi and Virginia delegates. In 
caucus, the Mississippi delegates came within a few votes of 
supporting Henry Wallace on the deliberate assumption that 
he would be the best choice to weaken the ticket and cause 
F. D. R* ®s downfall. The Virginia delegation was speci­
fically instructed to vote against Henry Wallace and also 
specifically uninstructed on how to vote for the presiden­
tial candidate. See, Allen Drury, A Senate Journal (New 
York, 1963) 215, 219, and 220-221.
^Pomper, op. cit., 164-165.
headed the third party known as the Texas Regulars? In 
South Carolina another unsuccessful third party movement 
arose? and in Louisiana, John U. Barr, a wealthy anti-New 
Deal businessman, initiated a Byrd-for-President movement. 
Anti-Roosevelt presidential electors were gradually 
ferreted out by the regular Democratic party organizations 
in the Deep South, and the attempted coup by conservative 
southern Democrats was generally unsuccessful? but was
openly fomented.^
Presidential politics from 1932 to 1944 evidenced 
increasing divisiveness and bitterness between conservative 
southern Democrats and pro-Roosevelt liberal Democrats. 
Similar Democratic divisiveness was also evident in 
Congress during this period, and by analyzing the 
congressional proceedings related to some important issues, 
an understanding of why this Democratic intra-party feud 
developed may be achieved.
In 1932, the South was in desperate need of economic 
relief, and in Congress conservative southerners generally 
refrained from active opposition to relief legislation . 1 ’’7 
During the Hundred Days, New Deal legislation created the
l^Key, Politics, Parties and Pressure Groups (1966), 
265? Freidel, op. cit., 51-52? Heard, A Two Party South?, 
55* 159* and 258-259? and Fuller, MNew Confederacy”, 10.
17Goldman, op. cit., 255? Schlesinger, The Coming of 
the New Deal, 424-428, 484, 4yi, 484 and 502? and 
Hofstadter, op. cit., 304-305.
Agricultural Adjustment Administration, the Civil Conserva­
tion Administration and numerous other boards and agencies 
dedicated to economic and social recovery. However, before 
the first year of the New Deal Era had expired, southern 
Democrats began to oppose Roosevelt’s legislative programs 
and policies.
3-8rphe roll call voting data presented in the following 
pages has been taken from the Congressional Record of the 
Senate only. As demonstrated by V. 0. Key, between 1933 and 
1946 southerners in both the House of Representatives and 
the Senate possessed a higher rate of voting solidarity than 
any other regional or coalition group, but the southern 
Senators and Representatives were by no means cohesive in 
regard to every issue. According to Key’s data, southern 
solidarity was most evident in roll call votes on racial 
matters such as civil rights legislation and economic 
matters which directly affected local southern interests 
such as legislation to set cotton prices. The roll call 
voting data presented below is primarily concerned with 
these types of issues, and therefore, the data related to 
one house of Congress should not be expected to differ 
materially from the data related to the other house. In 
other words, the Senate data shown below, when considered 
in light of Key's conclusions for this period, should be 
considered representative of the attitudes of southerners 
in both houses in regard to racial Issues and locally 
important economic questions. Although the voting behavior 
of the house members could be related to the characteristics 
of relatively small southern districts, the effort involved 
in such an analysis, when considered in light of the 
similarities in southern voting cohesion in both the House 
and the Senate, would probably not yield conclusions 
significantly different from an analysis of more confined 
Senate data. As demonstrated on pages 7 2 through 76 of 
this paper, this approach proves feasible at least for the 
purposes of this paper, since the participation of signi­
ficant conservative southern Democratic Senators in the 
Dixiecrat Movement can be distinctly related to their 
Congressional voting behavior and their local geographic 
surroundings. This comparative approach was also adopted 
because a number of southern Senators were identified as 
having been Dixiecrats, while participation in the movement 
was less marked among southern Representatives. With this 
being the case, the expectations of gathering signifleant 
data was believed to be more probable from a consideration 
of Senate data. See, Key, Southern Politics, 345-382, for a 
detailed analysis of the voting behavior of southerners in
The Bank Act of 1933 provided for safer and more
effective use of the assets of Federal Reserve Banks and of 
national banking associations; it regulated interbank 
control; and it prevented the undue diversion of funds into 
speculative operations. Huey Long, who by January of 1933 
had become anti-administration, called the Banking Act a 
perversion of American principles and ideals, and told the 
assembled Senate that the bill had no more chance of 
becoming law than he had of becoming the ”Pope of Rome”. 
However, Long was wrong, and despite southern opposition, 
the Bank Act was passed.
TABLE 2
ROLL GALL VOTE OF SOUTHERN SENATORS 
ON THE BANK ACT OF 1933
Yea Nay Not Voting
Bailey Connolly Bankhead
Barkley Sheppard Broussard
Black Byrnes
George Caraway
Glass Cohen
the House and Senate. K@y9s analysis is of particular 
interest because he works with the same time period as does 
this study. In the following analysis of the Senate data, 
much significance was attributed to the non-voting southern 
Senators as well as those who voted yea or nay. The 
assumption is that by not voting the particular senator was 
probably registering a negative attitude since he could have 
voted if present or could have had his vote counted by 
pairing with another senator if his attitude was positive.
By abstaining or by not pairing with a nay voting 
colleague, a senator could avoid a possibly unfavorable 
direct confrontation with the administration and still 
present his negative inclination.
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Harrison
MeKeliar
Robinson
Russell
Smith
Trammell
Fletcher
Hatfield
Logan
Longa
Neely
Stephens
Swansonl9
aThe fact that Huey Long did not vote despite 
the fact that he was present and opposed to the 
bllly is indicative of the correctness of the 
assumption that non-voting indicates a negative 
attitude.
Prior to the passage of the Bank Act of 1933* an amend­
ment to the bill providing for guaranteed bank deposits was 
introduced and approved by the Senate. However, southern 
opposition to this amendment was almost unanimous.
TABLE 3
ROLL GALL VOTE OF SOUTHERN SENATORS ON AN AMENDMENT 
TO THE BANK ACT OF 1933 TO GUARANTEE BANK DEPOSITS
Yea Nay Not Voting
Hatfield Bankhead Bailey
Caraway Barkley
Logan Black
Neely Broussard
Stephens Byrnes
Connally
George
Glass
Long
Reynolds
Robinson
Russell
Sheppard
Smith
Swanson
Thomas
Trammell^0
19congressional Record; Proceedings and Debates of the 
Second Session of the Seventy-Second Congress of the United 
St'ates"“nofr America, Vol. ?6 ^  Part 3~t January 2^, 1933 to ” 
February 4, 1933 (Washington, D. C ., 1933) 2508-2517 for a 
complete record of the debate and vote on the Bank Act of 
1933.
20ibld., 2512.
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In December, 1932 Hugo Black of Alabama introduced a 
bill in the Senate to reduce working hours by prohibiting 
interstate commerce in commodities and articles produced 
or manufactured by industrial activities in which persons 
were employed for more than five days per week or six hours 
per day. Black attacked the cotton textile industry for 
5 5 to 6 0 hour work weeks and 1 1 to 12 hour night shifts; 
the woolen industry for 5 0 to 6 7 hour work weeks and 13  
hour night shiftsj the lumber industry for 5 6 hour work 
weeks and the silk and rayon industries for 6 0 hour work 
weeks and 12 to 13 hour night shifts. He complained that 
despite increased hourly demands, industrial wages had 
decreased. As the result of pressure from a group of 
southern Senators led by "Cotton Ed" Smith of South 
Carolina, Black’s bill was tabled to be taken up later.21 
Black’s bill came to the Senate floor again in April, 1933, 
and a watered-down version was passed by the Senate. The 
opponents of the bill were successful in having it only 
specify a five-day work week, and hour and wages standards 
were left to industrial management. Most of the previous
2lCongressional Record; Proceedings and Debates of the 
Second Session of the Seventy-Second Congress of the United 
States of AmTrFc^~~~7oT~. 76 ^Bart^~~Deoember 5-30» 1932 
(Washington5 D. C ., 1932) 820, and Congressiona1 Record: 
Proceedings and Debates of the Second Session of the Seventy- 
Third Congress of the United States of America, Vol. -
Part 4, February 6-20, 1933 (Washington]! D^ cT, 1933) 
4304-4312.
opponents of the bill, including Smith, voted for the 
passage of the watered down version.22
In May, 1933 a bill came before the Senate to initiate 
the taxation of privately owned electric power companies, 
and with the help of southern opposition the bill was 
defeated.
TABLE 4
EOLL CALL VOTE OF SOUTHERN SENATORS ON A PROPOSED 
BILL TO INITIATE THE TAXATION OF PRIVATELY OWNED 
ELECTRIC POWER COMPANIES
Yea Nay Not Voting
Bankhead
Black
Caraway
George
Long
Neely
Reynolds
Russell
Sheppard
Trammell
Bailey
Barkley
Byrd
Byrnes
Hatfield
Logan
Robinson
Stephens
Glass 
MeKeliar 
Smith 
Thomas
The bill was reconsidered after an amendment was added 
specifying a flat three percent tax on privately owned 
electric power companies, and again the bill was rejected.
^ Congressional Record: Proceedings and Debates of
the First Session of the Seventy-Third Congress of the 
United States~~of~ America^ VoTT77””- Part ITT^lpri 1^4^24’, 
1933 (Washington, U. C., 1933) 1350.
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On this occasion, the southern Senators voted the same as 
before except Senator Smith voted nay instead of abstaining.^3 
In February, 1934 an amendment was proposed to the 
Civil Works Administration Act which provided for 
presidential appointment of the state directors of the 
C. W. A. State directors controlled the disbursement of 
Federal funds to local agencies, and despite strong southern 
opposition, the amendment was passed.
TABLE 5
ROLL CALL VOTE OF SOUTHERN SENATORS ON A PROPOSED 
AMENDMENT'TO THE CIVIL WORKS ADMINISTRATION ACT 
PROVIDING FOR PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENT OF STATE
DIRECTORS
Yea Nay Not Voting
Bailey Bankhead Byrd
Black Barkley Caraway
Long Byrnes George
Neely Connally Glass
Reynolds Harrison Hatfield
Russell MeKeliar Logan
Smith Robinson Stephens
Trammell Sheppard T h o m a s 24
In May, 1934 a bill came before the Senate which
provided for direct Federal control of corporate bankruptcy
proceedings. Southern Senators overwhelmingly opposed the
successful Corporate Bankruptcy Act of 1934.
23Congressional Record? Proceedings and Debates of the 
First Session of the Seventy-Third Congress of the United 
Stat¥s~^of'America, VoTl 77 - Part 2, April 4-24, 1933 
(Washington, D. C., 1933) 3240.
24gor)gresslonal Record: Proceedings and Debates of the
Second Session of the Seventy-Third Congress of the United 
States^of” America, VolZ 7& - Part SI May 3-20, 1934 
(Washington, D. C., 1934) 8082.
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TABLE 6
ROLL CALL VOTE OP SOUTHERN SENATORS ON 
THE CORPORATE BANKRUPTCY ACT OF 193^
Yea Nay Not Voting;
Thomas
Reynolds
Robinson
Russell
Sheppard
Bankhead
Black
Byrnes
Connally
Lons
MeKeliar 
Neely
Bailey
Barkley
Byrd
Caraway
George
Glass
Harrison
Hatfield
Logan
Stephens25
In January, 1938 a bill was presented to the Senate 
providing for the punishment of persons involved in 
lynchings and instituting measures to deter future 
lynchings. In order to prevent the passage of the bill, 
southern Senators began a lengthy filibuster* In late 
January and early February two roll call votes were taken 
in order to invoke cloture and to force the bill to a vote, 
and in both instances, the southerners overwhelmingly 
opposed cloture. The filibuster successfully concluded when 
the bill was tabled in February, 1938.
25Congressional Records Proceedings and Debates 
of the Second Session of the Seventy-Third Congress of 
the Uni ted “"states of' America, ~Vol« ?8 « Part 87 May 3-20. 19’ 
(Washington, D. C., 193^) 8082.
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TABLE 7
ROLL CALL VOTE OP SOUTHERN SENATORS ON THE MOTION 
TO ENFORCE CLOTURE OF DEBATE ON THE ANTI-LYNCHING
BILL OF 1938*
Yea
Barkley
Logan
Neely
Nay
Bailey
Bankhead
Bilbo
Byrd
Byrnes
Caraway
Connolly
Ellender
George
Glass
Harrison
Hill
Holt
MeKeliar
Overton
Pepper
Reynolds
Russell
Sheppard
Smith26
*The motion for cloture was proposed in 
January and February, 1938, and in both 
instances the southern votes were the same.
In June, 1938 a bill providing for Federal regulation 
of privately owned utilities was passed by the Senate. 
Southern opposition was clearly recorded by the voting.
26c ongressional Record; Proceedings and Debates of the 
Third Session of the Seventy-Fifth Congress of the United 
States of America, Vol. S3 - Part 1, January 3-2?, 1938 
{Washington, D. C ., 1938) 1 1 6 6 and Congressional Record; 
Proceedings and Debates of the Third Session of the Seventy- 
Fifth Congress of the United States of America, Vol. 53 - 
Part 2, January 28 to February 23, 1938 (Washington, D. C ., 
1938) 200?.
TABLE 8
BOLL CALL VOTE OF SOUTHERN SENATORS ON THE 
BILL PROVIDING FOR FEDERAL REGULATION OF 
PRIVATELY OWNED UTILITIES
Yea
Bailey
Bankhead
Byrd
Caraway
Nay
Bilbo
R vrrigs
Connally
Ellender
George
Hill
Holt
Logan
McKellar
Neely
Overton
Pepper
Russell
Sheppard
Smith27
Not Voting
Glass 
Karr i s on 
Reynolds
In an attempt to curb Congressional opposition,
Roosevelt campaigned against the renomination of a number of 
key anti-New Deal southerners and thereby he sought to "purge” 
and liberalize the Democratic party. He opposed Senator 
Smith of South Carolina, Senator George of Georgia and 
Senator Tydings of the border state of Maryland, as well as 
three deep southern congressmen. Roosevelt failed, and all 
of the anti-New Deal southerners were renominated and 
re-elected. This tactic embittered the southern delegates,
27Congressiona1 Record; Proceedings and Debates of the 
Third Session of the Seventy-Fifth Congress of the United 
States of America, Vol. 83 - Part 7, May 20 to June 7, 1938 
"(Washington, D. C., 1938) 795^*
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and caused them to oppose New Deal legislation more 
vigorously, particularly in the Senate.
In June, 19^2 an appropriations bill for the Civilian 
Conservation Corps came before the Senate. On two occasions 
the majority of southern Senators voted to discontinue funding 
the C. C. C. Both votes resulted in ties between the yeas 
and nays on the Senate floor, and in each instance, Vice 
President Henry Wallace, the President of the Senate, broke 
the tie in favor of the C. C. C.
TABLE 9
ROLL CALL VOTE OP SOUTHERN SENATORS ON BILL 
TO CONTINUE FUNDING THE C. C. C.*
Yea Nay Not Voting
Bilbo Bailey Barkley
Doxey Bankhead Caraway
Ellender Byrd Glass
Hill Connally O*Daniel
Kilgore George Overton
Pepper MeKeliar
Russell Maybank
Rosier Smith^9
■*The bill was voted on twice, once to amend 
it and once for passage, and the southerners 
voted the same way both times.
28^[ario Einaudi, The Roosevelt Revolution (New York,
1959) 9°“’92? Dexter Perkins, The New Age of Franklin 
Roosevelt (Chicago, 1957) 6 8 -6 9T  Rexford^Tugwell, The Art of 
Politicss As Practiced by Three Great American; Franklin 
Roosevelt, Munzo Karin, and Florella La Guardia (New~York, 
1*95?1 ^76*4'7b'l James B u r n s The Deadlock of Democracy:
Four Party Politics in America (Englewood Cliffs, 1 9 6 3 ) 1 6 3 ? 
John Gunther, Roosevelt in Retrospect (Garden City, 1950) 297? 
and Key, Southern Politics, 36T~and 375.
29Congressional Record? Proceedings and Debates of the 
Seventy“Seventh Congress of the United States of America,
Vol. 88 - Part 4, May 25 to June 30, 19^2 (Washington, D. C., 
19^2) 5612 and 5613.
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In November, 19^2 an anti-poll tax bill was introduced 
in the Senate, and in order to prevent its possible passage, 
a group of southern Senators initiated a filibuster. On 
November 2 3 a vote to enforce cloture failed to end debate, 
and the bill was tabled. Southern Senators clearly voted 
against cloture and against the elimination of the poll tax*
TABLE 10
ROLL GALL VOTE OF SOUTHERN SENATORS ON MOTION TO 
ENFORCE CLOTURE OF DEBATE ON ANTI-POLL TAX BILL
OF 19^2
Yea Not Voting
Barkley Bailey Glass
Kilgore Bankhead Reynolds
Pepper Bilbo
Thomas Byrd
Caraway
Gonnally
Doxey
Ellender
George
Hill
MeKeliar 
Maybank 
0 'Daniel 
Overton 
Russell 
Smith-?0
Throughout the New Deal numerous bills were passed to 
provide relief for the gravely depressed agricultural com­
munity, Despite the severe plight of southern farmers, their 
Congressional representatives voted against many measures
3QCongressional Records Proceedings and Debates of the 
Second Session of the Seventy-Seventh Congress of the United 
States of America^ Vol. 5 & - LPart 7* October 20 to 
DecemberTuTT~T9^2 (Washington, D. C., 19^+2) 9065»
proposed to aid farming.31 In April, 1933 the majority of 
southern Senators voted against the Farm Relief Act because 
it set fixed agricultural prices, Despite their opposition, 
the bill was enacted.
TABLE 11
ROLL CALL VOTE OF SOUTHERN SENATORS ON THE FARM
RELIEF ACT OF 1933
Yea
Caraway
Hatfield
Long
Neely
Reynolds
Russell
Smith
Thomas
Not Voting 
Bankhead
Nay
Bailey 
Barkley 
Black 
Byrd 
Byrnes 
Connally 
George 
Glass 
MeKeliar 
Robinson 
Sheppard 
Stephens 
Trammell 
Tydings32
In June, 1938 an amendment to the Federal Surplus 
Commodities Corporation Act providing the Corporation with 
5 0 million dollars for the direct purchase of agricultural 
commodities at fixed prices was passed by the Senate. In 
spite of the fact that this bill would disburse badly needed 
capital into agriculture, southern Senators opposed its 
passage.
3lFor material indicative of the severe plight of 
southern farmers see footnote A in Chapter I.
32congresslonal Record s Proceedings and Debates of the 
First Sessi on ol the Seventy-Third Congress of the United 
Statei^of^America, VolT T7~- Partf 2, A , l93T~ 
"[Washington, D. C •, 1933) 1637*
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TABLE 12
ROLL CALL VOTE OP SOUTHERN SENATORS ON AN AMENDMENT 
TO THE FEDERAL SURPLUS COMMODITIES CORPORATION ACT 
TO PROVIDE DIRECT PURCHASE OF AGRICULTURAL 
COMMODITIES AT FIXED PRICES
Yea
Bailey
Bankhead
Bilbo
Connally
Harrison
Hill
Holt
Pepper
Byrd
Byrnes
Caraway
George
Glass
Reynolds
Smith
Thomas
Tydings33
Not Voting
Ellender 
Barkley 
Logan 
MeKeliar 
Neely 
Overton 
Russell 
Sheppard
The goal of the Agricultural Adjustment Act was to 
achieve parity in farm prices by government purchase of 
agricultural commodities, crop limitation and Federal farm 
loans. In August, 19^2 the Senate voted to continue Federal 
loans to farmers growing and limiting certain commodities 
such as wheat and cotton. The southern Senators split on 
this question.
TABLE 13
ROLL CALL VOTE OF SOUTHERN SENATORS ON A 
MOTION TO CONTINUE FARM LOANS UNDER THE 
AGRICULTURAL ADJUSTMENT ACT
Yea
Bankhead
Barkley
Bilbo
Nay
Bailey
Byrd
Kilgore
Not Voting
Doxey
George
Glass
33congresslonal Record ; Proceedings and Debates of the 
Third Session of the Seventy-Fifth Congress of the United 
States of America, Vol. 83 - Part 7* May 20 to June 7* 1933 
T^shington, D. G., 1933) 8103.
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Caraway 
Ellender 
MeKeliar 
Maybank
0*Daniel
Overton
Hosier
Smith
Pepper
Reynolds
Russell3^
Feuding developed between southern and non-southern 
Democratic senators as the New Deal became more and more 
effective* In 1936 Senator Robert LaFollette*s Committee on 
Labor began investigating charges of unfair labor practices 
and abuses of civil rights by i n d u s t r y .35 LaFollette was 
opposed by a group of southern Senators led by Jimmy Byrnes 
of South Carolina. Byrnes had clearly demonstrated an anti­
labor position when he sought to amend the right to strike 
provisions of the Guffey-Vinson Bill because he asserted that 
such a right was *’illegal and contrary to sound public 
policy”, and as the Chairman of the powerful Senate Committee 
to Audit and Control the Contingent Expenses of the Senate,
3^Congressional Record: Proceedings and Debates of the
Second Session of the Seventy-Seventh Congress of the United 
States' of America, Vol. 88 - Part 5# July 1 to September 1^, 
19^2 (Washington, D. C . ,  19^2) 6Q2A. Also see. Burns, op. 
cite, 1 6 3 ; Schlesinger9 The Politics of Upheaval, 515-517; 
Binaudi, op. cit.s 90-92; PerkinsJ op. cit., 5B” 69; Tugwell, 
op. cit., 4 7 6 -^7 8 ; and Key, Southern Politics, 369-378, for 
accounts of similar opposition by southern members of the 
House of Representatives. Legislation cited includes wage 
and hour controls, Federal regulation of tideland oil reserves 
and mineral deposits, social security, banking regulations, 
anti-lynching laws, voter registration regulations and 
Federal control of farm crops and prices.
35The LaFollette investigations resulted from abuses of 
the Wagner Act which created the National Labor Relations 
Board, provided for collective bargaining, and forbade 
discrimination against unions or union labor.
Byrnes moved to discontinue funding the LaFollette 
Committee in order to stop the investigations. He was 
supported on the Committee by “Cotton Ed” Smith and Millard 
Tydings. The only thing that prevented Byrnes from cutting 
off LaFollette*s funds was direct presidential-intervention.
On July 26, 1939 Roosevelt sent a letter to Byrnes requesting 
that he not limit LaFollette’s budget. In spite of F. D. R. *s 
endorsement of the labor investigations, Senator Smith con­
tinued to oppose LaFollette*s Committee, and he warned the 
Senate against state socialism and encroaching Federal 
power. As a result of his committee*s probes, LaFollette 
introduced legislation to prohibit oppressive labor practices 
and anti-union regulations. LaFollette *s previous opponents 
were then joined by Josiah W. Bailey of North Carolina,
“Happy” Chandler of Kentucky, and Robert Reynolds of North 
Carolina. Reynolds successfully amended LaFollette1s bill 
and transformed it into a national defense measure excluding 
the employment of aliens, Communists a n d  N a z i s . 36
Senator George of Georgia opposed the Fair Employment 
Practices Commission, and in 19^3 be introduced an amendment 
to limit the Commission’s funds. With support from Senator 
Russell and a group of Republican switchers, George’s 
amendment was accepted.37 These are only two examples of the
36jerold S. Auerbach, Labor and Liberty: The LaFollette 
Committee and the New Deal ^Indianapolis, 1 9 6 6 ) 114-115, 73, 
158, 171-172, 1737“and 198-199.
37Drury, op. cit., 1 2 2 and 1 9 6 .
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feuding which developed in Congress as a result of the 
implementation of New Deal l e g i s l a t i o n . 38
The New Deal fostered greater Federal control of the 
economic and social character of the South, and the data 
indicates that southern Democrats opposed legislation which 
instituted direct Federal Interventi on m t  kj matters 
previously controlled by southerners. The data also indicates 
that in most instances the southern Democrats were tmsuccess- 
ful in stopping the expansion of Federal power. The southern 
Democrats were intent upon maintaining political power in the 
South, and opposition to the New Deal In Congress and to 
Roosevelt in presidential politics was the result. In 194A 
pro-New Deal Senator Claude Pepper of Florida and anti-New 
Deal Senator George of Georgia both agreed that the 
objective of southern Democrats was to preserve the political 
influence of the South.39
In many instances, the anti-New Deal southern Democrats 
were from black belt regions of the Deep South, and in local 
southern politics, they were members of the conservative,
“big mule”, planter, black belt faction.
By opposing the Bank Act of 1933# Senators Connally,
Sheppard, Bankhead, Broussard and Cohen were seeking to 
prevent Federal control of bank funds for speculation. All
38Drury *s A Senate Journal is filled with accounts and 
highlights of similar disputes. This is also true of 
Auerbach’s work.
39Drury, op. cit., 208. Drury reported this informa­
tion as the result of separate Interviews.
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of these Senators represented industrial areas of the black 
belt regions dependent upon speculative and available 
m o n e y . T h e  overwhelming opposition to fixed agricultural 
prices reflected the interests of the large black belt 
planters, and black belt Senators led these f i g h t s . B y  
opposing federally appointed administrators for state and 
local projects such as the Civil Works Administration and 
Federal control of corporate bankruptcy, black belt 
southern legislators directly demonstrated their desire to 
maintain southern political control . ^ 2 By opposing the 
Fair Employment Practices Commission and the National Labor 
Relations Board for enforcing equal employment opportunities, 
by upholding the poll tax, and by defeating anti-lynching 
laws, black belt southern Democrats demonstrated their
^Oconnally was from Marlin, Texas, and Sheppard was from 
Texarkana, Texas. Both are black belt cities in the Texas 
oil region* Broussard was from the mineral rich southern 
Louisiana black belt {New Iberia), Bankhead represented the 
Alabama black belt with Birmingham*s coal and iron center, 
and Cohen was from Georgia*s industrial center, Atlanta.
^Senator Russell, from Widner, Georgia, opposed this 
type of legislation as did fellow black belt Senators 
Overton (Alexandria, Louisiana), Smith (of South Carolina),
MeKeliar (Memphis, Tennessee), George (Vienna, Georgia), 
Byrnes (South Carolina), Bailey (North Carolina), Connally 
and Sheppard (Texas), Bankhead (Alabama), and Stephens 
(Mississippi). All of the legislators were strong in the 
black belt regions of their home states.
^2The Civil Works Administration Bill and the Corporate 
Bankruptcy Act were opposed by black belt Senators George, 
Logan, Stephens, Bankhead, Byrnes, Connally, MeKeliar, 
Sheppard, Bailey and Russell.
desire to maintain white supremacy.^3 By opposing Federal 
wage and hour regulations, black belt southern Democrats 
demonstrated a concern with preserving at least one of the 
significant advantages of southern industry, namely, lower 
wages for longer hours. ^  Throughout the New Deal, 
conservative black belt southern Democrats opposed legisla­
tion designed to take control of the South out of the hands 
of the southerners.^5 Also indicative of this is the fact 
that conservative black belt southern Democrats supported 
New Deal legislation which strengthened southern influence 
and control.
The black belt southern Democrats supported numerous 
bills and motions which provided relief for agricultural 
interests without direct Federal intervention. The 1933
^3senators Smith, Eastland, George, and Russell were 
consistent opponents of equal labor opportunities. The 
only black belt Senator to favor Federal lynching laws was 
Logan, and no southern Senator favored anti-poll tax 
legislation.
^Senators Byrnes, Smith, Chandler, Bailey, Reynolds, 
Stephens, George, Russell, and Eastland opposed legislation 
designed to regulate labor standards, wages and hours.
Within their districts were located many of the southern 
Industrial interests such as textiles (North Carolina, South 
Carolina), steel and coal mining (Alabama), and lumbering 
(Georgia, Alabama, and Mississippi).
*t5For example, in 1933» 1933, and 19 *^^  black belt 
Senators opposed Federal regulation of privately owned 
utilities. Participating in this opposition were Senators 
Bailey, Byrnes, Logan, Stephens, Connally, Ellender, George, 
McKellar, Overton, Russell, Sheppard, and Smith. In the 
South, most utility companies were privately owned. See,
The Blue Book of Southern Progress, 10, 17, 18, 33« (These 
pages show advertisements for privately owned utilities.)
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Relief of Agriculture Bill was passed by the Senate, following 
House approval, and was supported by anti-New Dealers such as 
Bankhead, Byrnes, Connally, George, Reynolds, Russell,
Sheppard, and Stevens . ^6 In 193^ a farm bill came into the 
Senate which proposed to place the cotton market on a sound 
commercial basis. The bill was defeated in the Senate 
despite the support of eleven black belt Democrats.^7 
Also, in 193^ the same bloc of southern Democrats supported 
the Farm Bankruptcy Act which allowed farmers to file for 
bankruptcy through the courts in the same manner as corporate 
business interests. This measure allowed farmers to liqui­
date their liabilities and keep their land.^ In 19^2 the 
black belt southern Democrats unanimously supported a bill 
that stated fixed prices but specified that no maximum 
prices would be established or maintained for any agricul­
tural commodity.^9 in 1 9 ^  Bankhead and Eastland introduced
^ Congressional Records Proceedings and Debates of the 
First Session of the Seventy-Third Congress of the United 
States oT^America, V6 iT" 7 7 Part 3 9 ApriT~°2 j to May 11,
1933 (Washington, D. C ., 1933) 2562.
^ Congressional Records Proceedings and Debates of the 
Second Session of the Seventy-Third Congress of the United 
States of America, Vol. 78 -Part 6 , March 28 to April 17/ 
1937 (Washington, D. C •, 193^) 5712.
^ Congressional Record: Proceedings and Debates of the
Second Session of the Seventy-Third Congress of the United 
Stab^^^f^America, Vol 7 7^ - Part 11, June 14-18, 193^ 
(Washington, D. C ., 193^) 12381.
^ Congressional Records Proceedings and Debates of the 
Second Session of the Seventy-Seventh Congress of the United 
States "oFllmerica, VoTT 8 8' - Part l,~~^January3^ 19^2 to 
February 197 19^2 (Washington, D. C ., 19^2) 2A2.
and debated an amendment to exempt the price of cotton from 
the control of the Office of Price Administration.50
In relation to industrial recovery, the black belt 
Democrats were consistent in that they supported legislation 
providing southern interests with relief without encumbrance. 
Black belt Democrats overwhelmingly supported the National 
Industrial Recovery Act of 1933* Tbe bill proposed to foster 
recovery by supporting the construction of public works 
dictated by local needs.51 in March, 193^ nearly all of the 
black belt Democrats supported a bill to include cattle as a 
basic industry, and thereby make the cattle industry eligible 
for reliefv" Agricultural diversification had fostered a 
growing and important cattle industry in the southern black 
belts.52 xn 1975 black belt Democrats, particularly those 
from mineral rich areas, favored a resolution to reduce taxes
1
on the expenses of intangible drilling and development 
costs.53 Southern reaction to the New Deal was determined
50Drury, op. cit., 190.
5lcongressional Record; Proceedings and Debates of the 
First Session of the Seventy-Third Congress of the United 
States of AmericaT" Vol» 77 - Part 6 , June B^l5, 1933 ™
(Washington, D. C«, 1933) 5^02.
52gongressional Records Proceedings and Debates of the 
Second Session of the Seventy-Third Congress of the United 
7tates~~ofTlraer i c a , Vol. 78~ - Part A, March 1-1^, 1937 
(Washington, D. C •, 193*0 *H51*
53united States of America Congressional Record: 
Proceedings and Debate of the First Session of the Seventy- 
Ninth Congress , Vol. 91 - Part 6 , July 2 to September 10, 
19737[washing t o n , D. C., 1975) 7&91*
by an insistence that the local establishment should 
control local affairs.
In the South the policies of the New Deal alienated 
much of the white population of the black belt agrarian 
areas against the national Democratic party. Black belt 
planters felt oppressed by Federal regulations which 
required them to plow under nearly mature cotton plants, and 
the New Deal inspired destruction of the tenant farming 
system, causing tenant farmers, as well as their landlords, 
to lose their farms,57 Such consequences of the New Deal 
precipitated enduring animosity in areas of the South 
represented by local conservative leaders such as Gessner 
T* McCorvey, the Alabama leader of the black belt and the 
“Big Mules”, Horace Wilkinson, a Birmingham attorney, judge 
and close friend of McCorvey, and Fielding Wright, the 
Governor of Mississippi.55
Southern industry was becoming nationally competitive 
during the New Deal Era, and a significant amount of resent­
ment was harbored against the “northern interests” for 
supposedly inhibiting southern industrial development and
57j. B. Shannon, “Presidential Politics in the South”, 
Journal of Politics, August, 1948, 489; Molyneaux, op. cit., 
100-102? Powell and Cutler, op. cit., 308-318; Jessee F. 
Sprague, “What *s Doing in Businesss The Cotton Country”, 
Saturday Evening Post (August 11, 1934) 23-30; S. K.
Badcliff, “The Changing American South”, Contemporary 
Review (July, 1937) 30-38.
55Key, Southern Politics, 245.
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competition. Frank Freidel, a noted Roosevelt biographer, 
estimated that seventy percent of the southern industrial 
interests opposed the regulatory policies of the New Deal, 
particularly the control of wages and hours. Since a signi­
ficant number of southern industries were located in the 
Deep South, and since this region usually represented 
conservative attitudes, Freidel*s estimation is probably 
close to being correct. The fact that anti-New Dealism 
existed among southern businessmen in light of the regulatory 
policies which the New Deal imposed, is not surprising.
Prominent anti-New Deal businessmen included John U. Barr 
and Leander Perez of Louisiana and “Business Ben” Laney, the 
former governor of A r k a n s a s . 56
Throughout the South, local Democratic spokesmen 
clearly opposed what they considered the encroaching social 
and economic powers of the New Deal, Among these spokesmen 
were Sam Jones, the Governor of Louisiana, Frank Dixon, the 
Governor of Alabama, Frank Upchurch, a Democratic committee­
man from Florida and opponent of Florida’s New Deal Senator,
Claude Pepper, Merritt Gibson, the leader of the Texas
56Freidel, op. cit., 95» E. B. Ader, The Dixiecrat 
Movement (Berkeley, 1951)* An Unpublished Doctoral 
Dissertations The University of California, 126? Jonathan 
Daniels, “Democracy is Bread”, Virginia Quarterly Review 
(Autumn, 1938) 481-490; Schlesinger, Coming of the New Deal,
504; and Key, Southern Politics, 9 6 , 2 3 6 , and 256. ~ — *
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Regulars, and Mississippi’s Delta spokesman, Senator 
James Eastland.57
Despite conservative southern Democratic opposition 
within the ranks of the Democratic party, in Congress and in 
the South, important New Deal legislation was proposed and 
approved by Congress, After 1938 the New Deal gradually 
began to function in the South, and the positions of conser­
vative southern Democratic leaders were weakened.
After Roosevelt’s death, President Truman proposed a 
legislative program, the Pair Deal, which attempted to con­
tinue the New Deal in its social and economic programs,
Truman supported compulsory health insurance, an enlarged 
farm program, a broader civil rights program, and Federal 
aid to education. Temporarily, the Fair Deal was stalled, 
but as.Truman, applied pressure conservative southern 
Democratic opposition became increasingly less effective in 
C o n g r e s s . 58 under Truman’s legislative leadership, there 
was little expectation that significant changes in the 
social and economic policies of the national Democratic 
party would occur.
57Sam Jones (as told to James Aswe11), “Will Dixie 
Bolt the New Deal”, Saturday Evening Post (March 6 , 1943)
20 and 42-45; Ader, The Dixiecrat Movement, 85; Fuller,
“The New Confederacy”, 11-12 $ and Key, Southern Politics,
9 6 , 2 3 6 and 2 5 6 .
58Roseboom, op. cit., 493? Burns, op. cit., 313; and 
Key, Southern Politics, 3 6 0 -3 6 6 ,
80
In 19^8 the prospects for Truman being elected 
President were not encouraging, and in the early summer of 
19^8, a "Dump Truman” movement developed which sought to 
replace Truman with Dwight D. Eisenhower as the Democratic 
candidate for president. Conservative southern Democrats 
were prominent in this movement which failed when Eisenhower 
refused to consider the Democratic draft.59 Having been 
unsuccessful in replacing Truman, conservative southern 
leaders became more dissatisfied and rumors of a southern
bo3.t increased. 8 0
At the outset of the 19^8 Democratic National Convention, 
Truman's nomination was almost certain, but regardless, 
conservative southerners opposed him. Southern delegates, 
probably in an attempt to strengthen their bargaining 
position, supported Senator Richard Russell of Georgia, and 
cast 263 votes against the successful Truman. Although 
Alben Barkley of Kentucky was selected as the vice 
presidential nominee, and conservative southerners accepted 
this nomination, they could hardly claim to have participated
59Roseboom, op, cit., 498™^99» Eaton, op. cit., ^26- 
^27; Jules Abels, Out of the Jaws of Victory (New York, 1959)
72-87. Thurmond, Laney, Tuck and Byrd of Virginia, Hill of
Alabama, and Jester of Texas supported the "Dump Truman” 
movement.
T r u m a n  Withdrawal Urged by Thurmond”, New York Times 
(July 10, 19^8) 7; Roseboom, op. cit., 4-99; and- Eaton, op. 
cit., 427, Thurmond stated that he favored a Democratic 
victory but Truman could not achieve this since he had
alienated the South with his civil rights demands.
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in his selection. Southern Democrats sought the restoration 
of the two-thirds rule and were again defeated. They were 
unable to Influence the composition of the Party's platform, 
and proposals for clarification and moderation of the civil 
rights plank were rejected. Conservative southern Democrats 
were again powerless to influence or control the politics 
and policies of the national Democratic party, and as a result, 
many bolted the 1948 Convention.
Prior to the bolt, Ben Laney of Arkansas and Fielding 
Wright of Mississippi had arranged for a rump convention to be 
held in Birmingham, Alabama, two days after the walkout.
On July 17, 1948 dissident conservative southern Democrats 
began to assemble .in Birmingham, and on July 18 and 19 they 
held a "conference”, "recommended” Governors J. Strom 
Thurmond of South Carolina and Fielding Wright of Mississippi 
as candidates for President and Vice President, and they 
launched the Dixiecrat Movement of 19^8. Delegates to this 
so-called "conference” included conservative southern 
Democrats who had bolted the National Democratic Convention, 
and conservative southern Democrats who had been active
8 l«southerners Fail To Get Candidate To Contest Truman 
On Rights", New York Times (July 12, 1948) 1; "Mississippi 
Group Seated After Row”, New York Times (July 14, 1948) 4; 
Abels, op. cit., 8 9 , 91-92 and 93? Roseboom, op. cit., 499? 
and Eaton, op. cit., 429 and 430,
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opponents of the New Deal both on the national and local
levels
Characteristically, Dixiecrats were white anti-New 
Deal black belt conservative Democrats who represented the 
economic, social and political interests of the planter,
"Big Mule", local conservative southern faction, 8am Jones 
was a prominent Louisiana Dixiecrat. As Governor of 
Louisiana, he had been an outspoken opponent of New Deal 
Intervention in local southern politics. ^ 3 Frank Dixon was 
a former conservative Governor of Alabama, a close associate 
of Jones, and an anti-New Dealer. In 19^8 he became the 
leader of the Alabama Dixiecrats . ^  John U. Barr, a 
prominent and wealthy New Orleans rope manufacturer, was 
ardently anti-New Deal, and in 1 9 ^  he led the unsuccessful
62Among those present at the Birmingham ^conference'1 
were Hardy Ellis, Fielding Wright, Marlon Rushton, Strom 
Thurmond, Senator Eastland, "Alfalfa Bill" Murray, Gessner 
T. McGorvey, Horace Wilkinson and Gerald L. K. Smith, see 
Abels, op. cit., 97? "Southerners Fail to Get Candidate to 
Contest Truman on Rights", New York Times (July 12, 19^8) 1; 
"Texas Unit Fights Bolt from Truman", New York Times
(July 13, 19^3) 1? "Truman Shunned by Votes of South", New
York Times (July 15, 19^8) 1? "Southerners Plan to Fight 
Truman on Electoral Vote", New York Times (July 17, 19^8) 1? 
"Southerners Name Anti-Truman Slate", New York Times 
(July 18, 19^8) 3.
63jones, op. cit., 20-21; Key, Southern Politics, 16^, 
17^, 178 and 3^1? Ader, The Dixiecrat Movement, 100? and
Heard, A Two Party South?, 25.
6^jones, op. cit., 21? "Southerners Pick Laney", New 
York Times (July 25, 19^8) 6? Key, Southern Politics, .3O'™ 
arid 6 3 4 ? Heard, A Two Party South?,”"26-27, and I59~l80? 
and Helen Fuller, "The New Confederacy", New Republic 
(December, 19^8) 12-13. Fuller stated that Dixon, as a 
lawyer, represented the Associated Industries of Alabama,
The National Association of Manufacturers, and the Alabama 
Power Co.
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Byrd-for-President movement. In 19^8 Barr was a Dixiecrat.85 
Leander Perez was the undisputed financial and political boss 
of Louisiana. Perez had bitterly opposed the New Deal, 
particularly the regulation of natural resources, and he had 
actively opposed Roosevelt. In 1948 Perez became a Dixie­
crat, and primarily due to his influence, Louisiana Democrats 
adopted Thurmond and Wright as their official candidates . 8 6  
Merritt Gibson had been the campaign manager of the anti- 
New Deal Texas Regulars third party movement of 1944? and 
in 1948 he was the national campaign manager of the Dixiecrat 
Movement.8 ? "Business Ben" Laney was a conservative 
businessman, political leader, and a former Governor of 
Arkansas. He was a long-time associate of the anti-New Deal 
Arkansas Free Enterprise Association; and in 1948 he served 
as the Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Dixiecrat 
Movement . 8 8 Gerald L. K. Smith, a racist, conservative 
southern Democratic leader, had actively supported Gene 
Talmadge and the anti-New Deal "Jeffersonian Democrats" and 
the Lemke-for-President movement in 1936. In 19^8 he became
65Ader, The Dixiecrat Movement, 142? Key, Southern 
Politics, 3^1] "Report from the South", New York Times 
(July 25, 19^8) 6 .
6 6sherrill, op. cit., 7 *
6 7Heard, A Two Party South?, 65, 114, and 258-261; Ader,
The Dixiecrat Movement, 81; "Southerners Pick Laney", 6 ; 
and Key, Southern Politics, 256-258.
6 8AbeXs, op. cit., 11, 19, 74, and 89; "Southerners Pick 
Laney", 6 ; Heard, A Two Party South?, 164, 261 and 297; and 
Key, Southern Politics, 198-199, 333» and 339*
a Dixiecrat. Gessner T. McCorvey, the loquacious leader 
of the Alabama black belt and the Industrial "Big Mules*1 f 
had been an ardent opponent of the New Deal, and in 19^8 he 
became a leading Alabama Dixiecrat.70 Horace Wilkinson, a 
McCorvey cohort, was an influential, anti-New Deal black 
belt attorney and judge. In 19^8 Wilkinson was a Dixiecrat 
candidate for presidential elector from Alabama and also a 
Dixiecrat spokesman.71 Frank Upchurch, a leading Florida 
conservative Democrat and a member of Florida*s Democratic 
Committee, had been an ardent opponent of Florida*s 
New Deal Senator Claude Pepper. He had led the movement to 
send unpledged delegates to the 1 9 ^  National Democratic 
Convention in order to oppose Roosevelt. In 19^8 Upchurch 
became the leading Florida Dixiecrat and a member of the 
Executive Committee of the Dixiecrat Movement.72 Senator 
Walter F. George of Georgia had consistently opposed the New 
Deal since the mid-1930*s; and in 1938 Roosevelt had attempted
69Abels, op. cit., 98 and 2151 and Ader, The Dixiecrat 
Movement, 95* Ader states that Smith was rejected by 
Thurmond due to his racist statements.
7°The term "Big Mule*1, refers to southern industrial 
interests. Key, Southern Politics, 332, 3^2, and 632-633? 
Ader, The Dixiecrat Movement, 123T and Fuller, "New 
Confederacy", 11-12. Fuller stated that McCorvey, as a 
lawyer, represented Standard Oil, Humble Oil, Gulf Oil, and 
Magnolia Petroleum and Tennessee Coal and Iron (U. S. Steel).
71"Rights Party Gains Mounting in South", New York Times 
(September 12, 19^8) 3 6 ; Heard, A Two Party South?, 28 and 
283 s Key, Southern Politics, 332, 33^ and "033- 6 35 s. and Ader, 
The Dixiecrat Movement, 125 •
72"Report from the South", 6 ; "Southerners Pick Laney",
6 s Ader» The Dixiecrat Movement, 130-132? Key, Southern 
Politics,~~96n and 33b; ITnTlIeard, A Two Party South?, 2 9 7 .
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to "purge” him along with other southern opponents of the 
New Deal. In 19^8 George became a leading Georgia Dixie­
crat. 73 In 1 9 ^  Dan Moody, a prominent conservative Texas 
Democrat had been a Texas Regular, and in 19^8 he was a 
Dixiecrat.7^ Palmer Bradley was a Houston lawyer 
representing Standard Oil and Hughes Tool Company? and in 
19^8 he was the first head of the Dixiecrat Movement in 
T e x a s . 75 Marion Rushton had been the Alabama delegate to 
the National Democratic Convention appointed by the southern 
caucus as chairman of a committee charged with finding a 
candidate to oppose Truman. He bolted the Convention with 
the rest of the Alabama delegation, and subsequently became 
the Chairman of the Alabama Dixiecrats. Rushton, as a 
lawyer, represented the Chase National Bank, the Buckeye 
Cotton Oil Company and the Capital Fertilizer Company.76 
Handy Ellis had been the unsuccessful conservative black
73Heard, A Two party South?, 159-16°» Abels, op. cit.,
25, 8 7 , 95, and 9 9 ? Lubell, op. cit., 32 and 35s and 
Sherrill, op. cit., W ,  and 62-6^.
7^Key, Southern Politics, 26ln, 268, and 601.
75Fuller, “The New Confederacy”, 12-13? and Heard, A
Two Party South?, 159-160.
76Ful3.er, "The New Confederacy”, 12-13? Heard, A Two 
Party South?, 159-160? "Southerners Fail to Get Candidate 
to Contest Truman on Rights”, 1? "Texas Unit Fights Bolt 
from Truman”, New York Times (July 13, 19^8) 1.
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belt candidate for the governorship of Alabama in 19^8.
Ellis led the Alabama bolters from the National Democratic 
Convention, attended the Birmingham ^conference”, and became 
a leading Alabama Dixiecrat.78 Fielding Wright was a 
Mississippi black belt conservative, an anti-New Deal 
advocate and Governor of his state* He led the bolting 
Mississippians from the National Democratic Convention, and 
at Birmingham he became the Dixiecrat candidate for vice 
president. Strom Thurmond did not bolt the National 
Democratic Convention, but he was present at Birmingham to 
accept the Dixiecrat nomination for president. Thurmond, 
although considered a racial moderate according to southern 
standards, was an unwavering white supremacist. As Governor 
of South Carolina, he had been anti-New Deal and inclined to 
favor black belt interests.79 Senator James 0. Eastland, 
the representative of Mississippifs black belt Delta region, 
had often opposed New Deal legislation; and in 19^8 he
??Key, Southern Politics, 42-^3• Ellis was defeated by 
neo-populist “Big Jim" Folsom.
^^southerners Fail to Get Candidate to Contest Truman 
on Rights”, 1; “Texas Unit Fights Bolt from Truman”, 1;
“Truman Shunned by Votes of South”, 1; “Southerners Plan to 
Fight Truman on Electoral Vote”, 1; and “Southerners Name 
Anti-Truman Slate”, 3*
79“Southerners Name Anti-Truman Slate*1, 3? and 
Sherrill, op. cit., 246-249.
he was a leading Dixiecrat strategist and s p o k e s m a n . 80 
“Alfalfa Bill” Murray had opposed Roosevelt*s presidential 
nomination in 1932; and as the Governor of Oklahoma, he had 
opposed the New Deal. In 19^8 Murray attended the Birmingham 
“conference” and became a Dixiecrat.81
The relationships between the regional strength, the 
platform, the campaign issues and the strategy of the Dixie­
crat Movement and the characteristics of the black belt 
regions presented in Chapters I and II become meaningful as 
they are related to the evolution and objectives of the 
Dixiecrat Movement. The regional strength of the movement 
was consistent with the black belt bailiwicks of most 
Dixiecrat leaders; the platform articulated opposition to 
the Democratic party for longstanding “abuses** of what the 
Dixiecrats considered Democratic principles; the campaign 
issues and policies of the movement further articulated 
opposition to the Democratic party and sought to attract 
voters and supporters by appealing to local prejudices and 
economic interests; and the strategy was devised to achieve 
the objectives of the movement by defeating Truman, by 
splitting the Democratic party, and by leaving the 
conservative southerners as a united and politically 
Influential bloc.
80puiierf “New Confederacy*1, 1 3 -1^1 “Southerners Plan 
to Fight Truman on Electoral Vote”, 1; and Sherrill, op. 
cit., 186, 1 8 7-1 8 8 , and 2 0 3 .
8l»*southerners Name Anti-Truman Slate**, 3; and page 50 
of this chapter.
Harold Lasswell stated that what men seek in political 
negotiations Is political power and that political power is 
measured according to the ability to influence the making of 
d e c i s i o n s . 82 During the New Deal era, conservative southern 
Democrats were usually unable to Influence the decision­
making process of the De moo ra tic party, and as a result, 
their efforts to maintain conservative southern political 
poorer eventuated an intra-party feud. The Democratic party 
was split nationally into conservative and liberal, northern 
and southern factions. By 19^8 conservative southern 
Democrats had become increasingly unable to influence the 
decision-making process of the Democratic party; and as a 
result, legislation and policies which provided the Federal 
government with increased authority to impose social, 
economic and political regulations on the South were being 
approved. Frustrated by their inability to regain signifi­
cant influence in their party by means of intra-party 
politics, conservative southern Democrats sought their 
objective by means of open conflict. After the Civil Rights 
Plank was approved by the National Democratic Convention, a 
reporter in The New York Times stated, “The South was 
finished as an effective influence in shaping the work and 
results of the (Democratic) convention.“ Later at the 
Birmingham "conference11, an unidentified official defiantly
82narold D. Lasswell, Power and Personality (New York, 
1 9 6 2 ) 2 3 3 and Harold D. Lasswell, Psychopathology and 
Politics (New York, 1930) 50.
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said that after Truman was defeated, "we (the southern 
Democrats) will be the dominant minority group and the 
northern city machines will have to come to us for their 
committee assignments." When commenting on the rise of the 
Dixiecrat Movement, Ben Laney stated, "The purpose (of the 
movement) was not to bolt the Democratic party but to bring 
that party more nearly under the direction of the South," 
Similarly, Fielding Wright told an audience in Jackson, 
Mississippi, that, "The strength shown by us tomorrow will 
almost assuredly govern to a large extent our success four 
years from now when we attempt to claim our rightful place 
at the council table of our p arty,"^3 v . 0. Key stated that 
third party movements often mirror the inner torments of a 
major political party, and the Dixiecrat Movement of 19^8 
arose from such torment,^
83"party to Fight on, Says Wright", New York Times 
(November 2, 19^8) 3; "Southerners Fail to Get Candidate to 
Contest Truman on Rights", 2; "Truman Shunned in Votes of 
South", 1? "Southerners Name Anti-Truman Slate", 3? and V. 
0, Key, Politics, Parties and Pressure Groups (New York, 
1 9 6 6 ) 2 8 0 ,
84Key, Politics, Parties and Pressure Groups (1 9 6 6 ),
280,
CHAPTER IV
SOME EFFECTS OF THE 
DIXIECRAT MOVEMENT OF 19^8
It may be concluded that the Dixiecrat Movement of 19^8 
was the product of the frustration of a group of conservative 
southern Democratic political leaders concerned about their 
declining power within the Democratic party? their failure 
to influence or control the policies regulating the develop­
ment of the South; and their continued inability to revitalize 
this diminished political power. The Dixiecrat Movement of 
1 9 ^ 8 was the culmination of at least sixteen years of 
political conflict among Democrats.
Ostensibly, the results of the Dixiecrat Movement were 
the electoral defeat of their candidates and the continued 
failure of the conservative southern Democrats to regain a 
leadership position in the Democratic party. For this 
reason, many Dixiecrats became further separated from their 
objective and less able to participate smoothly or effective­
ly in the political processes of the Democratic party. Some 
Dixiecrats were “purged" from the Democratic party and 
others, possibly as an effort to maintain their local 
political positions, switched to the Republican party. The 
Democratic National Committee barred Thurmond from any 
leadership position in the Party, and in 195^ he campaigned
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for the U. S. Senate as a Republican write-in candidate.
Other Democratic prodigals returned to the ranks of the 
Party where they found their positive influence and control 
of patronage damaged significantly. In one such case, 
Senator Eastland of Mississippi was ignored by the 
Democratic Nat ional Committee when he sought patx'wnagt*, anm 
former Dixiecrat Representatives from Mississippi and South 
Carolina were relieved of the privilege of making appoint­
ments *^ Instead of being a cohesive force in the South, 
the Dixiecrats divided southern Democratic voters and 
succeeded in winning electoral votes only in the Deep 
Southern states. These results are consistent with the 
traditional fate of American third party movements, namely 
f a i l u r e , ^ an£ they do not indicate the effects which the 
Dixiecrat Movement has produced in the South since 1948.
1 Marion Rushton of Alabama? J. B. Snider and Mrs. H. 
Gauthier of South Carolina? W. H« Talbot of Louisiana; and 
Mrs. A. Agnew of South Carolina were purged from the 
Democratic party due to their Dixiecrat affiliation. See, 
Facts on File (Vol. 57» 1949) 2 75X; and Heard, op. cit., 
23-25.
^American third party movements usually function 
exclusively on the national level and only endure one 
election. There have been exceptions, such as the 
Socialists and Prohibitionists, but their followers have 
remained small in number and their effect on the outcome 
of presidential elections has been minimal. See,
William B. Hesseltine, The Rise and Fall of Third Parties 
(Gloucester, 1957) 18, 28, and 51? and Ostrogorski, op. cit, 
xxxix and lx.
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In 1950 southern congressional elections were over­
shadowed by bitter struggles excited by racial issues, and 
several local southern progressives were defeated.3 E. B. 
Ader1s conclusion that the defeat of the Dixiecrat Movement 
marked the beginning of the liberalization of southern 
politics was shown to be invalid by events which occurx*9d 
only two years after the movement failed.**'
In 1952 the national Democratic party In an effort to 
avoid another southern bolt promised conservative southern 
leaders a greater role in the party’s politics. This 
maneuver may have been responsible for conservative southern 
Democrats x'emalning nominally Democratic, but in the matter 
of presidential voting, many Dixiecrat strongholds 
supported Eisenhower and some conservative southern leaders 
campaigned against Stevenson.5
3Among those defeated were Senators Frank P. Graham of 
North Carolina and Claude Pepper of Florida. See, Samuel 
Lube11, op. cit., 107-117 for an account of these elections 
and examples of the extreme racist positions assumed by 
their opponents. The precinct returns in these elections 
evidenced a significant overlapping between Graham and 
Pepper’s opponents and the returns for Thurmond and Dewey in 
1948.
**Ader, The Dixiecrat Movement, 105-110j and Ader, "Why 
the Dixiecrats Failed”, 390.
5Byrnes and Thurmond of South Carolina, Shivers of 
Texas and Byrd of Virginia supported Eisenhower rather than 
Stevenson, and Texas and Georgia anti-New Deal Democrats 
voted Republican in 1952. (These same areas had been 
Dixiecrat strongholds in 19^3.) See Burns, op. cit., 182- 
185 and 1 9 6 ? Rossiter, op. cit., 90-94j Lube11, op. cit.,
114 and 248 (Chart)j and Key, Politics, Parties and Pressure 
Groups (1964), op. cit•, 266.
In 195^ Thurmond, with the renewed support of James 
Byrnes, became the first South Carolina u. S. Senator to be 
elected by a write-in vote; and as a Senator, he has 
developed an unyielding conservative attitude In matters of 
national policy. His continued electoral success provides 
evidence that his approach to politics and policies is 
extremely popular in the Deep South . 6
Also in 195^ Eastland, Thurmond, Wright, Sam Jones, 
Herman Talmadge, John Bell Williams, L. Mendel Rivers, 
William M. Tuck, Coke Stevenson, and John U. Barr met in 
Memphis and formed the executive committee of a short­
lived organization dedicated to fostering conservative 
positions. Later, this same group, led by Eastland, 
established the segregationist White Citizens Council of 
America.?
In 1956 in spite of efforts by the national 
Democratic party to solidify their campaign in the South 
behind Stevenson, Dixiecrat areas of the Deep South
6sherrill, op. cit., 241-249.
7Sherrill, op. cit., 2 1 3 .
continued to support E i s e n h o w e r .& in these elections the 
lack of conservative southern support, in the once "Solid 
South", contributed significantly to successive Democratic 
defeats in the 1 9 5 2 and 1 9 5 6 presidential elections.
The Democratic intra-party politics of i9 6 0 seemed to 
indicate that a breakthrough, in favor of the interests of 
the southern Democrats, was beginning. Although the 
restoration of the two-thirds rule was rejected, a southerner 
was selected and nominated to run for the vice presidency.
The candidate, Lyndon Johnson, was not a conservative 1 but 
the South, with the exceptions of Florida, Virginia, and 
Tennessee, the three southern states with the greatest 
history of Republican competition, generally supported the 
Kennedy-Johnson ticket. However, i9 6 0 also witnessed some 
conservative opposition to the national Democratic party.
A Byrd-for-President movement formed in Mississippi and 
Alabama, and this movement captured six of Alabama’s 
electoral votes. At the National Democratic Convention,
^The term "Presidential Republicanism" refers to this 
voting behavior by Democrats who vote Democratic on the local 
level and state level but Republican on the presidential 
level. In 1956 Presidential Republicanism was evident in 
Florida, Texas, Arkansas, Tennessee, Virginia, and Louisiana. 
The extent of this voting pattern evident in other than 
previously Dixiecrat areas is beyond the scope of this 
essay, but the suggestion that voting coalitions developed 
between previously Dixiecrat and non-Dixiecrat areas would 
further indicate the effects of conservative entrenchment.
For evidence of Presidential Republicanism in previously 
Dixiecrat areas see, Rossiter, op. cit., 94; Lubell, op. 
cit., 248 (Chart); Key, Politics, Parties and Pressure 
Groups (1 9 6 6 ), 266-267; and Burns, op. cit., 185-186.
some southern states initially withheld delegates and 
sought to leave their electors unassigned, Dixiecrat-like 
sentiments were not eliminated by Johnson*s candidacy, and 
in i9 6 0 some Deep Southern former Dixiecrat areas persisted
in Voting Republican,^
In 1 9 6^ conservative southern Democrats ignored the 
fact that Johnson was an incumbent southern president, and 
voted against him in an outburst of Dixiecrat sentiment. 
Presidential Republicanism was evident in former Dixiecrat 
areas of the South,10 This voting behavior may have been 
influenced by the fact that conservative southern voters 
found the Conservative Goldwater more appealing than 
previous Republican candidates, but opposition to Johnson 
may be clearly delineated also. Politics, based on conflict 
among Democrats, continued in the South.
The presidential politics of 1 9 6 8 again demonstrated 
the continuing effect of the Dixiecrat Movement on southern 
politics, George Wallace, a third party candidate for 
president, sought to force the presidential election before 
the House of Representatives for resolution. Wallace 
disputed the policies of both the major parties, presented 
radically conservative policies regarding race and law
9Rossiter, op, cit., 90; Burns, op. cit., 315 and 272? 
and Lubell, op, cit., 2^8 (Chart).
10ln 1 9 6^ Louisiana, Georgia, Mississippi, Alabama, 
and South Carolina voted against Johnson. See Lubell, op, 
cit., 2^9 '(Chart).
enforcement, and was strongest in the former Deep Southern 
bailiwick of the Dixiecrats. Wallace differed from the 
Dixiecrats in that he appeared on the ballot in every state 
of the Union and he won a significant number of votes 
outside the South, but Wallace and the Dixiecrats were each 
concerned with exerting conservative strength in the South 
and the nation. Wallace’s tactics, strategy, and appeal 
were influenced by the Dixiecrat Movement, and he built his 
greatest following in the South among former Dixiecrat 
voters.^ To state that it was Wallace1s intention to 
build his party upon the Dixiecrat foundation would require 
much evidence, but the fact that Wallace directed his appeal 
to these.areas and they responded so clearly, would indicate 
that this is a distinct possibility.
Recently, the Republican party in the South has 
provided malcontent conservative southern Democrats with a 
vehicle and a standard under which to oppose the politics 
and policies of the national Democratic party, Although 
conservative southern Democrats are becoming nominal 
Republicans, they are not changing their political disposi­
tions. An attitude similar to this probably influenced 
Harry Byrd, Jr., of Virginia to quit the Democratic party 
and declare himself an independent. Eventually, Byrd may
llWallace polled 691,425 votes in Alabama, 535,550 
votes in Georgia, 530,300 votes in Louisiana, and 415,349 in 
Mississippi winning a plurality in each state? and in 
Texas, Florida, Tennessee, and South Carolina he ran second 
to one of the major parties.
find a position as a Republican more convenient. With the 
Republican party courting the South by means of indifference 
toward enforcement of Supreme Court decisions effecting 
school desegregation, student busing, Federal aid to 
education and standardized voting procedures, conservative 
southern Democrats are finding or considering the Repu blx can 
party to be a more efficient vehicle by which to oppose the 
national Democratic party than another third party movement.
Former Dixiecrat areas such as the black belts of 
Georgia, Louisiana, South Carolina, Mississippi and Alabama 
have developed into centers of overt southern racism and 
anti-civil rights protest; and although this may not have 
been exclusively a result of the Dixiecrat Movement of 1948, 
the Dixiecrats were able to excite these sentiments and 
present conservative positions by which such principles could 
be further articulated. The Dixiecrat8s rejection of liberal 
attitudes engendered a rejection of the civl rights program 
in the Deep South after November 2, 1948, but it would be 
naive to propose that significant racism did not already 
exist in the Deep South prior to the movement. However, 
the Dixiecrats did do much to provide the means for a 
politically legitimate expression of such prejudice. With 
the rise of racial demagogues such as George Wallace and 
Lester Maddox, in former Dixiecrat areas, racial tensions 
have been intensified and social development has been 
inhibited. It may be argued that without unrest and 
controversy, such demagogues would lose their appeal,
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influence, and local political power; and so, therefore, 
racial a g i t a t i o n  among excitable voters is their objective.
In relation to industry and labor, after 19^8 
factories were closed and employees were terminated when 
demands for unionization began; and racial Invectives were 
directed towards blacks who sought industrial employment * 
Business interests expanded local control and attempted to 
discourage outside developers from entering southern 
m a r k e t s * 3 . 2  ^s a result, southern industrial development 
was inhibited, southern workers earned less money, worked 
longer hours, and paid more for services than people in 
other parts of the country#3-3 At least to a degree, these 
results may be attributed to a Dixiecrat-like opposition to 
non-southern regulation of southern interest.
The Dixiecrat Movement was the means by which a group 
of conservative southern Democrats pursued their own self- 
interest, and the continuation of these efforts since 1 9 ^ 8  
has had a negative effect upon the development of the South. 
In many ways, the Dixiecrat Movement contributed to the 
inhibiting of the social, political and economic development 
of the South, and such results are probably more significant
l^schlesinger, The Crisis of the Old Order, 115-116; 
and Sherrill, op. cit., 10 and 122-123.
13Edna Cooper Flasuoka, “Motivation for Migration of 
Southern-Born Notables”, Social Forces (Summer, 1951) 2 9 0 ;
C . Horace Mayo, Selz and Hamilton, “Current Population 
Trends in the South”, Social Forces (Winter, 1 9 6 3 ) 77; 
and Harry Estill Moore, “Mass Communication in the South”, 
Social Forces (Fall, 1951) 365.
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than the third party movement itself. The Dixiecrats 
formulated and articulated the conservative southern posi­
tion and the defeat of the movement was the beginning of the 
entrenchment of that position in the Deep South against the 
liberal policies and politics of the national Democratic 
party. Just as Populism provided the dominant theme of 
southern politics at the beginning of the Twentieth Century, 
so anti-New Dealism and the Dixiecrat Movement of 19^8 have 
provided the political attitudes and positions of Conserva­
tive southern politics in the mid and latter parts of the 
Twentieth Century.
CHAPTER V
THE PLACE OF THE DIXIECRAT MOVEMENT IN 
THE HISTORY AND THEORY OF AMERICAN 
THIRD PARTIES
Traditionally, American third parties have been over­
whelmingly unsuccessful in regard to winning elections, 
especially presidential elections. The most significant 
reason for the consistent failure of American third parties 
has been the already noted American electoral system. Since 
this system functions to the advantage of a strong two- 
party system, and since third parties have been consistently 
unsuccessful within this system, it may be concluded that 
it functions to the disadvantage of third parties. Due to 
the lack of proportional representation and with simple 
majority voting, there are no shared successes, and so, 
third parties enjoy very little prospect of electoral 
success.1 Additional factors may also be identified as 
having contributed to the general inability of American 
third parties to achieve electoral victories. In general, 
the major parties are politically moderate since under the 
two party system electoral success is predicated by the 
ability to deal with a multiplicity of interests. However,
3-Rossiter, op. cit., 10.
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third parties are usually able to deal only with the 
limited interests of a geographic region or a particular 
social or economic group; and therefore, they become 
politically radical . 2 In the United States, radical appeals 
have caused a polarization of right and left wing third 
parties; and since appeals to radicalism have generally gone 
unheeded by the majority of Americans, the moderate center 
has consistently constituted the successful major parties. 
Clearly, radical polarization has worked to the disadvantage 
of third parties.3 Also related to the two-party system is 
the tendency of American voters to vote for one of the major 
parties since such votes are believed to be of more effect 
than votes for a third party.^ Voter inefficacy contributes 
to the inability of a third party to defeat the second major 
party on a sectional basis and thereby establish a 
sectional stronghold from which to continue opposition.-5
2Zucker, op. cit., 33« (Although this is a book of 
readings, these represent Zucker's oi<m comments.)
3Hossiter, op. cit., 8-9. In 1948 this polarization 
effect significantly assisted Truman's election. The Dixie­
crats polarized the right and Henry Wallace polarized the 
left with the result that Truman became the "middle of the 
road” Democratic candidate, Wallace was also successful in 
cutting into Dewey's voter strength, again to Truman's 
advantage. See, Lubell, op. cit., 196-204- for a detailed 
treatment of this aspect of the 1948 presidential election.
4Ibid., 30; and V. 0. Key, Public Opinion and American 
Democracy (New York, 196?) 193» 194-195, and 505-507.
5Rossiter, op. cit., 32-
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Financially, third parties have generally been unable to 
acquire enough support to finance a national campaign, and 
since most third parties function on the level of 
presidential politics, the inability to pursue a truly 
national campaign has severely limited the possibility of 
third party success. The major parties possess national 
organizations and regional bases of strength; but in 
general, third parties never develop independent national 
organizations or lasting Independent geographic strongholds.
As a result, third parties often endure for one election 
only . 6 Another cause for the relatively short duration of 
most third parties is the fact that third parties raise 
issues which once introduced force the major parties to 
assume policy positions which negate the efforts of the 
third parties. As the major parties resolve the issues 
raised by third party movements, the movements lose their 
raison d'etre and disappear.7 In some cases, third parties 
endure but the actual percentage of votes acquired hardly 
justify their continued existence.®
In many states, there are fees and legal difficulties 
involved in getting a spot on the ballot, and such
6 Duverger, op, cit., 207; Hesseltine, op. cit., 28; 
and Sorauf, op. cit., 34.
7Rossiter, op. cit., 5 and 10; and Key, Politics,
Parties and Pressure Groups (1 9 6 6 ), 255*
®This is true of the Socialists and the Prohibitionists.
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hindrances have often prevented third parties from 
participating in elections.9
It may be concluded that the atmosphere of American 
politics has not been favorable for the development or 
participation of third parties, but they have continued to 
exist. In an attempt to understand why these often quixotic 
movements participate in American politics when their only 
hope for victory is founded upon a tenuous hope that the 
majority of voters will eventually recognize the inherent 
value of their programs, Fred E. Haynes reasoned that by 
bringing new issues before the voters and by agitating them 
to a point where they would demand action, third parties 
seek to force major parties into considering issues that 
they would otherwise probably avoid. He concluded that the 
primary role of third parties was the education and agitation 
of voters in order to indirectly achieve social and economic 
reforms via the major parties. In this manner, third 
parties perform a valuable and unique function,3-0 and they 
also prevent the two major parties from becoming 
complacent due to their secure and unchallenged positions in
9Although less evident today, such restrictive 
procedures do still exist, George Wallace was able to get 
on the ballot in all 5 0 states; and so, it is possible if the 
third party has the organization and money to undertake legal 
proceedings or legislative battles. Third parties of the 
left had little of either. Third parties of the right can 
expect to do better as evidenced by George Wallace's renewed 
presidential candidacy in 1 9 7 2 and his vigorous presidential 
primary campaigning.
3-0Haynes, op. cit,, 1-5 and 470.
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the two-party system. Conversely, Moisie Ostrogorski 
reasoned that although third parties had often been refuges 
for honest but absurd convictions seeking recognition, they 
were incapable of winning political power because they 
lacked the characteristics of a major party. Since 
Ostrogorski measured the level of success of a political 
party upon the amount of political power that it possessed 
or that it was capable of acquiring, he concluded that 
powerless third parties were not to be considered as true 
political parties and that in the electoral process they 
should rather be regarded as hopeless protests only. 3-3-
The analyses and conclusions of both Haynes and 
Ostrogorski are independently valid, but neither of these 
treatments should be considered to be universally valid nor 
applicable to third parties in general. The apparent 
disparity Is the result of the difficulty Involved in 
accurately categorizing American third parties and the danger 
involved in generalizing about a subject that possesses so 
many variables that each occurrence could be unique. For 
instance, Haynes drew his analysis and conclusions from a 
discussion of mid-Western third parties of social and economic 
protest which were dissident wings of the major parties. He 
treated the Liberal Republican Movement of 1872-1884, the 
Farmers Movement of 1873-1875# the Greenback Movement of
3-lostrogorski, op. cit., xxxix, 175# and 353*
105
1880-1890, the Populist Movement of I8 9 O-I9 OO, and the 
Progressive Movement of 1900-1910, 12 These third parties 
caused considerable voter agitation, and as a result, the 
major parties adopted many policies which these third 
parties had advocated, Haynes1 conclusion, when properly 
qualified, is correct.
On the other hand, Ostrogorski probably drew his con­
clusions from an analysis of long enduring third party move­
ments which advocated extremely radical policies and which 
were overwhelmingly defeated in every election in which they 
participated, Ostrogorski fs concision would be correct 
for such American third parties as the Prohibitionists, who 
advocate prohibition of alcoholic beverages, the Vegetarians 
who advocate the cessation of animal butchery for food 
products, or the ever-present Socialists who want a 
Socialist America,
The above examples serve to demonstrate the necessity 
of properly categorizing a third party before it is possible 
to generalize concerning its role. Distinct categories of 
third parties are difficult to define since many qualities 
are shared by several different groups. Variations of 
particular types also arise, making it more difficult to 
identify the differentiating characteristics/ Many writers 
have attempted to define categories of third parties, but
12Haynes, op. cit., A-5.
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these attempts usually do not allow for the variations which 
occur. For example, Clinton Rossiter identified his first 
category of third parties as those of social and economic 
protest such as the Populists, and his second category as 
left wing splinter parties such as the Socialists. However, 
a left wing splinter party could be protesting economic and 
social conditions, and if so, into which category should it 
be placed? In order to achieve a more accurate and meaning­
ful description of third parties and thereby to be able to 
assess their political roles, their traits should be 
enumerated completely instead of attempting to "pigeon­
hole^ third parties into incongruous categories. Third 
parties may be characterized as varieties of strategic 
adaptations to different two-party situations in conflict? 
and they may be identified by traits such as the following, 
either singly or in combinations: social and economic
protest; splinter secessionist or bolters, either left or 
right wing or from a major party? single issue 
obsessionists? regional, sectional or single state? personal 
following of a dissident hero? doctrinaire or ideological 
and non-doctrinaire or non-ideological; transient or 
short-lived? and local interest, ^-3
13Rossiter, op. cit., 4-5? Sorauf, op. cit., 33?
Zucker, op. cit., 6 8 -6 9 .
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In his work on political parties, Norman Zucker 
categorized the Bull Moose Party as a secessionist movement 
from the Republican party, but in a similar work, Clinton 
Rossiter categorized the Bull Moosers as the following of a 
dissident hero.1^ Neither category fully identified the 
movement, and as a result, any assessment of the movements 
role would be made more difficult.
The Dixiecrat Movement of 1948 shared the same fate as 
nearly all of its predecessors? namely, electoral failure.
Despite the fact that they won 33 electoral votes, the
Dixiecrats were overwhelmingly defeated by both of the major
parties, However, in many ways, the Dixiecrat Movement was 
different from previous third party movements. Most 
significantly, the Dixiecrats were not pursuing an electoral 
victory based upon a mythical awakening of the voters. They 
devised a two-pronged strategy which could have placed
Thurmond in the White House or which could have insured
Truman’s defeat. In either case, the Dixiecrats reasoned 
that southern political power would have been the end 
product. To achieve their strategic alternatives, the 
Dixiecrats improvised political tactics which could have 
provided the movement with a strong regional basis from 
which to campaign. They sought to take over the established 
Democratic party structure in the South and establish a
l^Rossiter, op. cit., 5? Zucker, op, cit., 6 9 .
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regional conservative party. The Dixiecrats wanted to win, 
and they vigorously pursued this goal. As a result of this 
effort, they were able to get on the ballot in every state 
in which they tried except Oklahoma, and they were 
successful in acquiring significant financial assistance 
from major contributors. The failure of the Dixiecrat 
Movement was the result of their inability to implement 
their strategy and tactics, it was not the result of 
meaningless aspirations or frustrated expectations.
If we attempt to categorize the Dixiecrat Movement of 
1948 as a right wing secessionist or splinter group of the 
Democratic party, our effort would be accurate but 
incomplete.^5 The Dixiecrat Movement of 1948 was a non- 
ideological, regional Deep Southern black belt right wing 
secessionist movement which opposed the liberal policies and 
politics of the national Democratic party and which supported 
national policies favorable to local conservative control of 
southern political, economic and social interests. The 
Dixiecrat Movement sought political power? and unlike most 
previous third party movements, it possessed the potential 
for achieving this goal. Because of its goal and its 
potential for electoral success, the role of the Dixiecrat 
Movement must be considered to have been that of a political 
party actually participating in an electoral process and not
-^This is how Zucker and Rossiter categorized them.
See, Zucker, op, cit,, 6 9 and Rossiter, op. cit., 5.
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that of a pointless protest or organized agitation movement 
which may influence the electoral process but not actually 
participate therein.
APPENDIX I 
THE SOUTHERN BLACK BELT REGIONS
The Virginia and North Carolina black belts are divided 
by the eastern section of their border, and they generally 
encompass an over-all area extending from Virginia’s 
Eastern Shore, through Petersburg, Virginia, to Winston- 
Salem, Raleigh and Rocky Mount, North Carolina. The only 
other black belt region in North Carolina is an area in the 
southern part of the state surrounding Fayetteville. 
Southeastern and Central South Carolina constitutes South
I
Carolina’s black belt. This area is approximately bound on 
the west by Columbia and on the east by the Atlantic Ocean. 
Georgia’s black belt is an arching strip across central 
Georgia bound on the north by Augusta and Atlanta and on the 
south by Savannah, Macon and Albany. There are two isolated 
black belt regions in northeast and northwest Florida. One 
is on the east coast in the Jacksonville area and the other 
is along the west central Georgia border in the Tallahassee 
area,
Alabama’s black belt consists of an irregularly defined 
strip across southern Georgia approximately bound by 
Anniston, Birmingham and the Tuscaloosa area in the north and 
by a line between Greenville and Dothan extending through the 
northern tip of Mobile Bay to the Mississippi border in the
110
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south. The black belt regions of Mississippi are located 
in two separate areas. The first on the central eastern 
(Alabama) border extending north to south from Columbus to 
Meridian and the other extends along the Mississippi River 
from the Tennessee border through Jackson to the Louisiana 
delta border. These regions contain approximately half of 
Mississippi. The Tennessee black belt is actually an 
extension of the Mississippi black belt Into the Memphis 
area. The Arkansas black belt is also contiguous to the 
Mississippi River and is bound on the west by Paragould,
Little Rock and Pine Bluff. Eastern Louisiana’s black belt 
is similarly situated along the Mississippi with Vicksburg, 
Opelousas and Baton Rouge providing western and southern 
boundaries. Louisiana's black belt also extends along its 
northern border through Monroe and Shreveport. The Texas 
black belt is located in the eastern corner of the state and 
runs from approximately Longview to the Houston area.
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APPENDIX II 
STATES' EIGHTS PLATFORM OF 1948
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for effectuating the principles upon which the party is 
founded? that a platform of principles is a solemn covenant 
with the people and with the members of the party? that no 
leader of the party, in temporary power, has the right or 
•privilege to proceed contrary to the fundamental principles 
of the party, or the letter or spirit of the Constitution 
of the United States? that to act contrary to these principles 
is a breach of faith, a usurpation of power, and a 
forfeiture of the party name and party leadership.
We believe that the protection of the American people 
against the onward march of totalitarian government requires 
a faithful observance of Article X of the American Bill of 
Rights which provides that? "The powers not delegated to 
the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it 
to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or 
to the people.”
THE PRINCIPLE OF STATES' RIGHTS
We direct attention to the fact that the first platform 
of the Democratic Party, adopted in 18^0, resolved that: 
"Congress has no power under the Constitution to interfere
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with or control the domestic institutions of the several 
states, and that such states are the sole and proper judges 
of everything appertaining to their own affairs not 
prohibited by the Constitution."
Such pronouncement is the cornerstone of the Democratic 
Party. A long train of abuses and usurpations of power by 
unfaithful leaders who are alien to the Democratic parties 
of the states here represented has become intolerable to 
those who believe in the preservation of constitutional 
government and individual liberty in America.
The Executive Department of the government is promoting 
the gradual but certain growth of a totalitarian state by 
domination and control of a politically minded Supreme 
Court. As examples of the threat to our form of government, 
the Executive Department, with the aid of the Supreme Court, 
has asserted national dominion and control of submerged oil- 
bearing lands in California, schools in Oklahoma and 
Missouri, primary elections in Texas, South Carolina and 
Louisiana, restrictive covenants in New York and the 
District of Columbia, and other jurisdictions, as well as 
religious instruction in Illinois.
PERIL TO BASIC RIGHTS
By asserting paramount Federal rights in these 
instances, a totalitarian concept has been promulgated which 
threatens the integrity of the states and the basic rights 
of their citizens.
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We have repeatedly remonstrated with the leaders of the 
national organization of our party but our petitions, 
entreaties and warnings have been treated with contempt.
The latest response to our entreaties was a Democratic con­
vention in Philadelphia rigged to embarrass and humiliate 
the South.
This alleged Democratic assembly called for a civil- 
rights law that would eliminate segregation of every kind 
from all American life, prohibit all forms of discrimination 
In private employment, in public and private instruction and 
administration and treatment of students; in the operation 
of public and private health facilities? in all transporta­
tion, and require equal access to all places of public 
accommodation for persons of all races, colors, creeds and 
national origin.
PROPOSED FBI POWERS
This infamous and iniquitous program calls for the 
reorganization of the civil rights section of the Department 
of Justice with a substantial Increase in a bureaucratic 
staff to be devoted exclusively to the enforcement of the 
civil rights program; the establishment within the FBI of a 
special unit of investigators and a police state in a 
totalitarian, centralized, bureaucratic government.
This convention hypocritically denounced totalitarian­
ism abroad but unblushingly proposed and approved it at 
home. This convention would strengthen the grip of a police
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state upon a liberty-loving people by the imposition of 
penalties upon local public officers who failed or refused 
to act in accordance with Its ideas in suppressing mob 
violence.
We point out that if a foreign power undertook to force 
upon the people of the United States the measures advocated 
by the Democratic convention in Philadelphia, with respect 
to civil rights, it would mean war and the entire nation 
would resist such effort.
The convention that insulted the South in the party 
platform advocated giving the Virgin Islands and other 
dependencies of the United States "the maximum degree of 
local self-government."
When an effort was made to amend this part of the plat­
form so as to make it read that the party favored giving the 
Virgin Islands and the several states the maximum degree of 
local self-government, the amendment adding the words "these 
several states" was stricken out and the sovereign states 
were denied the rights that the party favors giving the 
Virgin Islands.
PAST LOYALTY
We point out that the South, with clock-like regularity, 
has furnished the Democratic Party approximately 50 percent 
of the votes necessary to nominate a President every four 
years for nearly a century. In 1920 the only states in the 
union that went Democratic were the eleven Southern states.
Notwithstanding this rugged loyalty to the party, the 
masters of political intrigue now allow Republican states in 
which there is scarcely a Democratic office holder to 
dominate and control the party and fashion its policies.
NEW POLICY
As Democrats who are irrevocably committed to democracy 
as defined and expounded by Thomas Jefferson, Andrew Jackson 
and Woodrow Wilson, and who believe that all necessary 
steps must be taken for its preservation, we declare to the 
people of the United States as follows:
1. We believe that the Constitution of the United 
States is the greatest charter of human liberty ever con­
ceived by the mind of man.
2. We oppose all efforts to invade or destroy the 
rights vouchsafed by it to every citizen of this republic.
3. We stand for social and economic justice, which we 
believe can be vouchsafed to all citizens only by a strict 
adherence to our Constitution and the avoidance of any 
invasion or destruction of the constitutional rights of the 
states and individuals. We oppose the totalitarian, 
centralized, bureaucratic government and the police state 
called for by the platforms adopted by the Democratic and 
Republican conventions,
4. We stand for the segregation of the races and the 
racial integrity of each race; the constitutional right to 
choose one's associates; to accept private employment
without governmental interference, and to earn one's living 
in any lawful way. We oppose the elimination of segregation 
employment by Federal bureaucrats called for by the misnamed 
civil rights program. We favor home rule, local self- 
government and a minimum interference with individual 
rights.
5. We oppose and condemn the action of the Democratic 
convention in sponsoring a civil rights program calling for 
the elimination of segregation, social equality by Federal 
fiat, regulation of private employment practices, voting and 
local law enforcement.
6 . We affirm that the effective enforcement of such a 
program would be utterly destructive of the social, economic 
and political life of the Southern people, and of other 
localities in which there may be differences in race, creed 
or national origin in appreciable numbers.
7. We stand for the checks and balances provided by 
the three departments of our Government. We oppose the 
usurpation of legislative functions by the executive and 
judicial departments. We unreservedly condemn the effort to 
establish nation-wide a police state in this republic that 
would destroy the last vestige of liberty enjoyed by a 
citizen.
8 . We demand that there be returned to the people, to 
whom of right they belong, those powers needed for the 
preservation of human rights and the discharge of our 
responsibility as Democrats for human welfare. We oppose a
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denial of those rights by political parties, a barter or 
sale of those rights by a political convention, as well as 
any invasion or violation of those rights by the Federal 
Government.
We call upon all Democrats and upon all other loyal 
Americans who are opposed to totalxtarlanlsm iioixits cxiin. 
abroad to unite with us in ignominiously defeating Harry
S. Truman and Thomas E. Dewey, and every other candidate 
for public office who would establish a police state in the 
United States of America.
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